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INTROSPECTION  THROUGH  LITIGATION
Joanna C. Schwartz*
ABSTRACT
This Article contends that there is a bright side to being sued: organizational defendants
can learn valuable information about their own behavior from lawsuits brought against them.
Complaints describe allegations of wrongdoing.  The discovery process unearths documents and
testimony regarding plaintiffs’ allegations.  And in summary judgment briefs, expert reports,
pretrial orders, and trial, parties marshal the evidence to support their claims.  Each of these
aspects of civil litigation can bring to the surface information that an organization does not have
or has not previously identified, collected, or recognized as valuable.  This information, placed in
the hands of an organization’s leaders as the result of litigation, can be used to improve systems
and personnel.
This Article considers the information generated by litigation, the gaps lawsuit data can fill
in the information otherwise available to organizations, and possible reasons some organizations
may gather and analyze litigation data more frequently than others.  To illustrate these concepts,
I draw on original research of police departments and hospitals and evidence from other organi-
zational settings.
INTRODUCTION
No organization relishes the prospect of being sued.  Lawsuits are costly
and time consuming to defend against and can lead to negative publicity,
increased government oversight, and other woes.  But some organizations
also see a bright side to being sued: through litigation, organizations can
learn about their own behavior.  These organizations review information
developed during the course of litigation—complaints, depositions, docu-
ments exchanged in discovery, expert reports, briefs, and trial transcripts—to
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better understand weaknesses1 in personnel, training, management, and pol-
icies.  The process of organizational learning through information generated
in lawsuits is what I call introspection through litigation.
Although introspection through litigation has not received sustained
attention by scholars,2 it operates at the intersection of two well-established
concepts.  The first is that organizations must understand their strengths and
weaknesses in order to operate effectively and improve—a process that has
been referred to as “organizational introspection.”3  Organizations may
gather information about their own performance4 but also often seek out
information from outsiders through customer surveys, audits, and manage-
1 For the purposes of this discussion, I use the term “errors” to refer to those events
that may lead to litigation and “weaknesses” as those characteristics of personnel, training,
management, and policies that may cause errors to occur.  I use the term “performance
improvement efforts” to refer to steps taken to reduce errors and weaknesses.  I use these
terms as a sort of shorthand, but recognize several ways in which they could be contested.
First, organizations’ leaders will not always agree with these definitions and will differ in
the ways that they understand their strengths and weaknesses.  One police chief might
consider a rise in lawsuits alleging the unconstitutional “stop and frisk” of pedestrians to be
a troubling sign that his officers are exceeding the bounds of their constitutional authority,
while another might view the same rise in suits as a positive sign that his officers are
engaged in aggressive policing. See infra notes 183–85 and accompanying text (describing
this possibility).  In addition, the definitions are overly narrow to the extent that some
cases without legal merit may nevertheless reveal information of interest and use to organi-
zational leaders. See infra note 114 (describing this possibility).  Finally, I recognize that
suits do not always reveal useful information, and I describe the limitations of lawsuits as a
source of information in Section I.D.
2 A handful of scholars have observed that defendants may learn something about
their own behavior in the process of defending a suit, but have not paid sustained attention
to this idea. See, e.g., TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: HOW LAWSUITS
HELPED THE CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEX ABUSE 14–17 (2008) (noting that
bishops learned about some allegations of clergy sex abuse through lawsuits); Mark S.
Hochberg et al., Perspective: Malpractice in an Academic Medical Center: A Frequently Overlooked
Aspect of Professionalism Education, 86 ACADEMIC MED. 365, 367 (2011) (suggesting that mal-
practice cases be used for medical training); Margo Schlanger, Operationalizing Deterrence:
Claims Management (in Hospitals, a Large Retailer, and Jails and Prisons), 2 J. TORT L. 1, 31–35
(2008) (describing how researchers and hospitals review medical malpractice claims files as
a means of improving performance).
3 See, e.g., PAUL GLEN, LEADING GEEKS 88 (2003) (describing “organizational introspec-
tion” as the process of “understand[ing] honestly the capabilities of one’s own organiza-
tion, including its technical and managerial strengths and weaknesses”); MICHAEL POWER,
THE AUDIT SOCIETY 54 (1997) (“Gatekeeping mechanisms like auditing, and record keep-
ing and disclosure requirements become important as ways of connecting the different
layers and of encouraging a certain kind of organizational introspection.” (citations
omitted)).
4 Organizations may conduct this internal analysis voluntarily. See, e.g., Schlanger,
supra note 2, at 20–23 (describing a large retailer’s claims management procedures that
require employees to report and investigate accidents and possible wrongdoing both to
manage claims and to improve performance).  Regulatory requirements can also force
organizations to gather information about their performance. See generally Louis Lowen-
stein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96
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ment consultants.5  Outsiders are believed to offer valuable insights because
they have fresh perspectives, are disengaged from organizations’ internal
politics, and are not predisposed in favor of existing personnel and
practices.6
The second is that lawsuits can unearth information about misconduct
that organizations have hidden from regulators and the public at large.7
Outside auditors or regulators may not have the authority, tools, or motiva-
tion to pry the information from corporate executives’ white-knuckled grip.8
But plaintiffs’ attorneys, unencumbered by allegiances to the industry and
driven by the financial and other associated benefits of a win, are highly moti-
vated to seek out information supporting their claims.  Liberal discovery
rules, including rules empowering courts to compel production of evidence
and sanction those who do not comply, pressure defendants to turn over
information that they would prefer to keep secret.
Introspection through litigation combines the recognized value of orga-
nizational introspection with the observed power of litigation to unearth
information.  For organizations interested in learning about their perform-
ance, lawsuits are, in essence, unsolicited audits by deeply dissatisfied custom-
COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342–45 (1996) (describing how financial and environmental regula-
tory disclosure requirements cause organizations to pay closer attention to their behavior).
5 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER D. MCKENNA, THE WORLD’S NEWEST PROFESSION: MANAGE-
MENT CONSULTING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2006) (describing widespread use of man-
agement consulting by corporations); Christopher Meyer & Andre Schwager,
Understanding Customer Experience, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2007, at 116 (describing the impor-
tance of understanding customer experiences and methods of collecting and measuring
customer satisfaction); Stephen Wagner & Lee Dittmar, The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes-
Oxley, HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 2006, at 133, 136 (observing that outside auditors have helped
corporations get better information about their performance).
6 See, e.g., THOMAS A. LIMONCELLI ET AL., THE PRACTICE OF SYSTEM AND NETWORK
ADMINISTRATION 308 (2d ed. 2007) (recommending outside audits of an organization’s
information systems because outsiders have “distance from the work that is going on, and
their approach will be unaffected by expectations and inside knowledge”); Marty Parker,
Know Thyself: Corporate Culture Begins with Introspection, FIN. POST (Feb. 7, 2012, 12:28 PM),
http://business.financialpost.com/2012/02/07/know-thyself-corporate-culture-begins-
with-introspection/ (advising that “[c]ultural assessments [of an organization] are best car-
ried about by a third party who is sure to be objective, and will be perceived as such”).
7 For scholarship examining how lawsuits publicly reveal useful information, see, for
example, TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 162 (2005) (observing that high-
profile medical malpractice lawsuits reveal information that may “energiz[e] government
agencies to discipline doctors or order hospitals to take corrective action”); Timothy D.
Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policy Making: Evaluating Climate-Change
Litigation in Light of Lessons from Gun-Industry and Clergy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 1837, 1843–58 (2008) (describing information revealed in gun litigation and clergy-
sexual-abuse litigation); Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products
Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 711–27 (2007) (showing how gun litigation and
breast implant litigation have unearthed previously unknown information and thereby sup-
plemented regulatory efforts).
8 See Wagner, supra note 7, at 696–97 (describing information costs associated with
agency regulation).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 4  2-MAR-15 14:15
1058 notre dame law review [vol. 90:3
ers who are highly motivated to describe their claims in the strongest terms,
uncover all evidence relevant to their case, and present that evidence in the
most compelling light.  Hearing from a deeply dissatisfied, highly motivated
customer may be an unpleasant experience, but it can also be illuminating.9
Just as lawsuits can publicly reveal information hidden by corporate execu-
tives from outsiders, lawsuits can surface information that employees have
purposefully or negligently failed to provide to management.
In prior work, I have studied the ways in which police departments and
hospitals gather and analyze information from lawsuits brought against them
and what both types of organizations learn from litigation data.10  This Arti-
cle draws on my studies of police departments and hospitals—as well as evi-
dence about information generated through litigation against airlines, auto
manufacturers, correctional facilities, and the Catholic Church—to offer
generalizable observations about this phenomenon.
Part I considers what organizations can learn from the lawsuits brought
against them.  Although organizations gather information about their per-
formance from multiple sources, lawsuits can surface information that has
fallen through the cracks of organizations’ other information systems.  Com-
plaints may describe allegations of wrongdoing that employees never
reported to their supervisors.  During discovery, lawyers may unearth details
about the plaintiff’s allegations that other investigators did not have the time
or fortitude to seek out.  And in complaints, summary judgment briefs,
expert reports, pretrial orders, and trial itself, parties marshal the evidence—
meaning they interpret, organize, and present information to support their
claims—in ways that may prove illuminating.  Each of these aspects of civil
litigation can draw attention to previously unknown or underappreciated
information and insights that organizations can use to identify and correct
weaknesses in personnel, training, management, and policies.
9 Of course, hearing from a deeply dissatisfied customer through a lawsuit can also be
unpleasant and unilluminating.  I discuss the limitations of lawsuits as a source of informa-
tion in notes 109–25 and accompanying text.
10 In two articles, I studied the frequency with which police departments gather and
analyze information from suits brought against them and their employees, and the ways in
which litigation-attentive departments use lawsuit data to improve performance. See
Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement
Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (2010) [hereinafter Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics]
(studying the practices in twenty-six law enforcement agencies across the country and find-
ing that law enforcement officials rarely collect information about lawsuits brought against
their department and officers); Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 841 (2012) [hereinafter Schwartz, What Police Learn] (examining the
practices in five law enforcement agencies that review lawsuits for lessons). In a third
article, I examined the use of litigation data in hospital performance improvement efforts.
See Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for Medical Malpractice Reform, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1224 (2013) [hereinafter Schwartz, A Dose of Reality] (studying whether—and how—hospi-
tals gather and analyze litigation data, based on thirty-five in-depth interviews and a survey
of more than 400 risk managers and patient safety personnel).
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To be sure, information generated during the course of litigation is
flawed in several respects.  Because very few people who have been harmed
ever sue and damages awards are calculated based on the severity of the
plaintiff’s injury rather than the degree of the defendant’s wrongdoing, law-
suit filings and outcomes are a poor indicator of the frequency and severity of
organizational misconduct.11  The adversarial nature of litigation can also
cause parties to overclaim or shade the truth in their pleadings, briefs, and
testimony.12  These flaws do not, however, disqualify lawsuits as a source of
useful information.  All information is impacted by the manner in which it is
produced, the interests of those producing the information, and its intended
use.  Organizations that engage in introspection through litigation do so in
ways that take account of these limitations while still benefitting from the
insights lawsuits can provide.13
Organizations that review lawsuits for lessons have learned about person-
nel and policy weaknesses and have used that information to prevent similar
events from recurring in the future.  Yet some organizations do not take
advantage of the litigation information at their disposal.  In my research, I
found that most hospitals make some effort to learn from the lawsuits
brought against them, but few police departments do so.  Part II considers
why some organizations might engage in introspection through litigation
more often than others.  It seems reasonable to assume that an organization
will engage in introspection through litigation only if the organization wants
to understand and improve its performance, views lawsuits as a source of valu-
able information about organizational errors and weaknesses, and has the
infrastructure and personnel in place to analyze lawsuits for lessons.  Hospi-
tals generally meet each of these conditions, as do the few law enforcement
agencies that analyze information from lawsuits.  Most other law enforcement
agencies, it seems, do not have the incentives, personnel, or favorable view of
lawsuits as a source of information that would lead to introspection through
litigation.  By comparing the incentives and systems in place in hospitals and
police departments, this Article identifies a variety of ways in which regula-
tory mandates, financial incentives, personnel, and evidentiary rules might be
used to encourage police departments and other organizations to pay closer
attention to the information in lawsuits.
I. WHAT ORGANIZATIONS CAN LEARN FROM LAWSUITS
The notion that an organization could learn anything about its behavior
through the litigation process may be counterintuitive.  After all, the organi-
zation, through its employees, engaged in the alleged misconduct and orga-
11 See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text (describing the limitations of the
volume of cases filed and the amount paid to plaintiffs as sources of information about
organizational behavior).
12 See infra notes 113–16 and accompanying text (describing distorting effects of the
adversarial system).
13 See infra notes 121–25 and accompanying text (describing the ways that organiza-
tions analyze lawsuit information).
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nizational leaders will, one presumes, have access to the documents and
witnesses that may prove revelatory.  But that presumption ignores the facts
of institutional life.
In complex organizations, information is decentralized and held by a
number of different people and entities.  It is the low- and mid-level employ-
ees who often have the most direct and immediate exposure to valuable
information.14  Police officers or their direct supervisors may be the first to
learn of an allegation of excessive force.15  Nurses attending to their patients
may be the first to learn of medical errors.16  Store managers may be the first
to learn of customer reactions to new products.17  In these settings, claims of
possible wrongdoing will not come to a decisionmaker’s attention unless she
is somehow informed.18  Complex organizations may fashion systems to carry
critical information from these front-line employees to higher levels of man-
agement, but gaps in design and implementation can frustrate information
collection efforts.19  For any number of reasons, those at the highest levels of
governance may not learn about incidents of wrongdoing or critical details of
those incidents.
14 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corpora-
tions Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101,
119–20 (1997) (“Information is highly decentralized in business organizations.  Especially
when we focus on information and inferences that are not readily quantifiable—for exam-
ple, customer reactions to new products, how well products are proceeding through the
research and development pipeline—relatively low- or mid-level managerial personnel will
have the most immediate access to useful information.”); see also KENNETH J. ARROW, THE
LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 33–43 (1974) (discussing organizations and the flow of
information).
15 See Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, 18 POLICING & SOC’Y 23, 24 (2008) (“Most
police officers work alone or with a partner, and the top brass know little about what they
do out there except what they report on pieces of paper that they sometimes fill out to
document their activities.”).
16 See, e.g., Shuh-Jen Sheu et al., Using Snowball Sampling Method with Nurses to Under-
stand Medication Administration Errors, 18 J. CLINICAL NURSING 559, 560 (2008) (“[N]urses
are aware of more medication errors from private or colleagues’ communications than
nursing management is aware of from filed incident reports.”).
17 See, e.g., Jane E. Dutton et al., Reading the Wind: How Middle Managers Assess the Con-
text for Selling Issues to Top Managers, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 407, 407 (1997) (“It is often
middle managers rather than the top managers who have their hands on the ‘pulse of the
organization’ . . . .”).
18 See Langevoort, supra note 14, at 119 (“One subject on which there is substantial
agreement over the full range of organization studies is that ‘upward’ information flow
poses a challenge for coherent corporate decisionmaking.”).
19 These have been referred to as the problems of information acquisition, transmis-
sion, and aggregation.  John Ferejohn, The Lure of Large Numbers, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1969,
1984 (2010) (book review).  For foundational descriptions of these information problems,
see, for example, ARROW, supra note 14, at 53 (“The information has to be coordinated if it
is to be of any use to the organization.  More formally stated, communication channels
have to be created within the organization.”); RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A
BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 109–10 (1963) (describing “routing rules” and “filtering
rules” governing the communication of information in large organizations).
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Lawsuits produce three types of information that can fill the gaps in
organizations’ other information systems.  First, plaintiffs’ complaints may
announce allegations of wrongdoing that internal reporting systems did not
collect.  Second, during discovery, lawyers may unearth details about plain-
tiffs’ claims that an organization’s internal investigators did not search for or
find.  Third, throughout litigation, parties marshal the evidence—meaning
they interpret, organize, and present information—in ways that may prove
illuminating.
In Sections I.A–C, I show how information can be announced,
unearthed, and marshaled during litigation with examples from suits against
several different types of large organizations—police departments, hospitals,
correctional facilities, the Catholic Church, airlines, and an auto manufac-
turer.  My contention is not that organizations have learned from lawsuits in
all of the examples I offer; in Part II, I describe the very limited information
that is available about what organizations actually do with lawsuit informa-
tion.  Instead, my focus here is on the types of information that lawsuits gen-
erate that may be of use to organizations.  In Section I.D, I describe the
limitations of lawsuits as a source of information about organizational per-
formance and the ways in which organizations learn from lawsuits despite
these limitations.  Section I.E concludes with observations about the value of
lawsuit data to organizations interested in understanding and improving
their performance.
A. Announcing Harms
Lawsuits may notify organizations about allegations of wrongdoing.
When there is a high-profile event, such as a police shooting or an airplane
crash, lawsuit complaints are likely unnecessary to notify an organization’s
leaders that the event occurred.  The defendant named in the suit will almost
certainly know a great deal about the case from the press and its employees
long before a lawsuit is filed.  Moreover, when alleged wrongdoing was com-
mitted or orchestrated by those at the very highest levels of governance, law-
suits are unnecessary to bring information about the event to organizational
leaders’ attention.20  But there are many other types of incidents committed
by low-level actors that do not garner press attention.  Although organiza-
tions often have systems to capture information about harms when they
20 For example, information about products’ dangers—the effects of asbestos,
tobacco, and the Dalkon Shield—may well be known by those at the highest levels of cor-
porate decisionmaking. See, e.g., PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS
INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 117–19 (1985) (describing efforts by manufacturers to keep informa-
tion about asbestos dangers from the public); PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN: THE TRUTH
BEHIND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY COVER-UP (1996) (describing efforts to hide the damaging
effects of tobacco); MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE
DALKON SHIELD (1985) (describing efforts to hide information about the damaging effects
of the Dalkon Shield).  Lawsuits may reveal useful and previously unknown information
about those decisions to the public. See supra note 7.  Lawsuits will not, however, be illumi-
nating to the executives who made those decisions.
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occur,21 allegations of wrongdoing may fall through the gaps of these infor-
mation systems.
Some gaps are the result of design flaws: internal reporting systems may
not be suited to collect information about certain types of allegations that
result in litigation.  For example, almost all police departments require
officers to file reports when they have used force.22  Yet departments gener-
ally do not require officers to report incidents that do not involve force—
illegal searches or warrantless home entries, for example—that can be the
basis for constitutional claims.  Moreover, some departments do not require
their officers to report all types of force; an officer will most likely be
required to file a report after firing their gun, but may not need to fill out a
report after handcuffing someone, striking someone with their flashlight, or
assaulting someone with a police dog.23  By reviewing lawsuits, police depart-
ments have learned of allegations of misconduct that officers were not
required to report, including claims that officers engaged in improper vehi-
cle pursuits, warrantless home entries, and illegal searches.24
Hospitals have more comprehensive reporting systems than police
departments: through incident reports, reports to risk management, patient
complaints, and executive walk rounds, hospital information systems are
designed to gather information about all types of errors as soon as they
occur.25  Yet hospitals’ reporting systems are not well designed to capture
information about incidents of medical error that are not immediately
observable.  Missed diagnoses, delayed diagnoses, and treatment errors may
only be apparent months or years after a doctor has provided medical care.
If, for example, a doctor misreads a chest x-ray as normal, neither the doctor
nor the patient will know of that error until the patient develops lung can-
cer.26  If a doctor fails to remove a sponge during surgery, no one may know
21 See Schlanger, supra note 2, at 10–13 (describing the ways in which organizations
acquire information); see also id. at 19–48 (describing information systems and claims man-
agement more generally in three organizational settings).
22 See INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS 136 (2006), available
at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/e06064100.pdf.
23 See Schwartz, What Police Learn, supra note 10, at 868; see also CHARLES R. EPP, MAK-
ING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 251
(2009) (reporting, based on a survey of police departments across the country, that 93.7%
of departments required a report when an officer used a baton against a civilian, 57.6%
required a report after using a “twist lock or wristlock” on a civilian, and 32% required a
report after using a “firm grip” on a civilian).
24 See Schwartz, What Police Learn, supra note 10, at 869–70 (describing allegations of
police misconduct revealed through litigation).  Departments could also learn about these
types of incidents through civilian complaints.  Yet a Bureau of Justice Statistics survey
found that very few people who believe they have been mistreated file civilian complaints.
See id. at 862–63 (describing civilian complaint policies and evidence that people infre-
quently file civilian complaints even when they believe they have been mistreated by the
police).
25 See Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1235 (discussing hospital data collec-
tion practices).
26 See id. at 1280.
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of this error until years later, when the patient undergoes another surgical
procedure.27  Lawsuits are better suited than hospitals’ internal systems to
reveal these types of claims with delayed manifestations.  Consistent with this
observation, studies have found that a significant number of missed and
delayed diagnoses and allegations of improper treatment are revealed for the
first time in lawsuits.28
Federal reporting mandates governing airlines are even more extensive
than those governing hospitals.  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
requires reporting and investigation of any incident that takes place on an
airplane causing serious injury or death or damage to the airplane.29  Its
reporting system captures thousands of errors and “near misses,” events that
could have—but did not—result in a crash.30  Most, if not all, airlines also
have their own internal systems to capture and analyze errors.31  Yet there are
some types of incidents—including air turbulence, emergency descents, and
inappropriate behavior by airline personnel—that do not need to be
reported and so may only come to an airline’s attention when described in a
lawsuit.32
Beyond information gaps resulting from the design of internal organiza-
tion systems, organizations may also not know about wrongdoing because
personnel do not report errors even when they are required to do so.
Employees in a wide array of organizational settings—including police
officers,33 medical personnel,34 clergy,35 and airline employees36—have all
27 See id. at 1280 n.277.
28 See id. at 1278 (noting that hospital risk managers and patient safety personnel
“reported that when lawsuits reveal previously unreported claims, they most frequently
concern diagnostic and treatment errors”); see also Osnat Levtzion-Korach et al., Integrating
Incident Data from Five Reporting Systems to Assess Patient Safety: Making Sense of the Elephant, 36
JOINT COMM’N J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 402, 402 (2010) (finding that malpractice
claims are more likely to allege delayed and missed diagnoses and treatment errors than
other types of reporting systems).
29 FAA Order No. 8020.11C, Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification, Investiga-
tion, and Reporting (Oct. 4, 2011), available at http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/
media/Order/8020.11C%20with%20Chg%201.pdf.
30 See Alan Levin, FAA Error-Reporting Program Reveals Hazards, Yields Fixes, USA TODAY
(Apr. 5, 2010, 9:38 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-04-04-
faa-error-reports_N.htm.
31 See GLOBAL AVIATION INFO. NETWORK WORKING GROUP B, ROLE OF ANALYTICAL
TOOLS IN AIRLINE FLIGHT SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS vi (2d ed. 2004) (“[M]ost, if not all,
airlines have established a process for collecting and analyzing air safety reports . . . .”).
32 See Telephone Interview with David Rapoport, Aviation Attorney (Jan. 30, 2012)
(observing that many incidents involving injury—including injuries from turbulence and
emergency descents—have not been found in National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reports).
33 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLE-
ANS POLICE DEPARTMENT 14 (2011) [hereinafter NEW ORLEANS] (finding widespread under-
reporting of uses of force by its officers resulting in part from “poor understanding of what
force must be reported” and in part from the “systemic failure to hold officers accountable
for not reporting force”); Letter from Shanetta Y. Cutlar, Chief of Special Litig. Section of
Civil Rights Div., to Roosevelt F. Dorn, Mayor, City of Inglewood, Cal., at 16–17 (Dec. 28,
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been found to underreport mistakes and misconduct.  Organizational soci-
ologists have offered several observations that may explain low reporting
rates: employees may not want to get themselves or their colleagues in
trouble;37 may intend to file a report but run out of time or forget to do so;38
or may decide not to report because such incidents are part of the job and
therefore cannot be prevented.39
Even when an employee reports an incident, he may shade the truth in a
way that protects himself or his colleagues.40  An investigation of the Phila-
delphia Police Department’s officers’ use-of-force reporting found that
reports were so vague as to be incomprehensible: “A ‘head injury’ could refer
2009) (describing use-of-force reporting in the Inglewood Police Department as “under-
inclusive”); Letter from William R. Yeomans, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Anthony Williams, Mayor, District of Columbia & Charles H. Ram-
sey, Chief of Police, Metro. Police Dep’t (June 13, 2001), available at http://www.justice
.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/dcfindings.php (finding that Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment policies regarding use of force were inconsistently followed; although policies
required officers to report “use of firearms, electronic stun devices, pepper spray (oleo-
resin capsicum), batons, carotid artery holds, and forcible frisks,” only the use of firearms
was regularly reported).
34 See, e.g., David C. Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’ Shows that Adverse Events in Hospi-
tals May Be Ten Times Greater than Previously Measured, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1, 4–5 (2011) (find-
ing that ninety percent of adverse events were unreported in three hospitals recognized for
patient safety initiatives); James A. Taylor et al., Use of Incident Reports by Physicians and
Nurses to Document Medical Errors in Pediatric Patients, 114 PEDIATRICS 729, 729 (2004) (find-
ing that over two-thirds of nurses and physicians reported medical errors less than forty
percent of the time).
35 See, e.g., Madeleine Baran, Number of Alleged Sex Abusers Greater than Archdiocese Has
Revealed, MPR NEWS (Feb. 19, 2014), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/collections/catho
lic-church/2014/02/19/investigation-more-priests-accused-of-sexual-abuse-in-twin-cities-
catholic-church/ (reporting that the Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis underre-
ported abusive priests).
36 See, e.g., Associated Press, Investigation Reveals Underreporting of Airplane Near Misses at
Dallas-Fort Worth, AVIATION PROS (June 24, 2005), http://www.aviationpros.com/news/
10434278/investigation-reveals-underreporting-of-airplane-near-misses-at-dallas-fort-worth.
37 See ARROW, supra note 14, at 75 (describing the tendency to filter information);
Langevoort, supra note 14, at 121 (observing that “employees with the most immediate
access to basic information are almost always line personnel” whose “operational responsi-
bilities and reporting duties create[ ] an obvious conflict of interest”); Taylor, supra note
34, at 729 (reporting that medical personnel underreport for fear of implicating others).
38 See A. Ian Glendon, Accident Data Analysis, 7 J. HEALTH & SAFETY 5 (1991) (describ-
ing time constraints).
39 Sharon Clarke, Safety Culture on the UK Railway Network, 12 WORK & STRESS 285
(1998) (attributing some underreporting to the inevitability of accidents).
40 For discussions of the way in which employees may filter information, see ARROW,
supra note 14, at 75 (“The efficiency loss due to informational overload is increased by the
tendency in that situation to filter information in accordance with one’s preconceptions.”);
CYERT & MARCH, supra note 19, at 81–82 (describing biases in the communication of
information).
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to a scratch, sutures, a concussion, or a broken skull.”41  When a commission
compared Los Angeles Sheriff’s deputies’ use-of-force reports with lawsuits
filed regarding the same incidents, it found that deputies’ reports “almost
always [were] at wide variance with the allegations made by the plaintiff in a
lawsuit” such that “a deputy’s report alone could not have alerted a supervi-
sor to a problem.”42
Plaintiffs are likely to describe incidents of alleged wrongdoing in their
lawsuit complaints with more detail than do employees internally reporting
that same alleged wrongdoing.  In contrast to the fear, embarrassment, and
time constraints that can prevent employees from reporting—or fully report-
ing—possible misconduct, plaintiffs have good reasons to file detailed, com-
pelling pleadings.  For cases filed in federal court, the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly43 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal44 require
plaintiffs to include facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief in their
complaint.45  Defense counsel have welcomed these rigorous pleading stan-
dards because they will, presumably, lead to more dismissals at an early stage
of litigation.46  These pleading requirements have an additional benefit for
organizational defendants that review complaints for lessons: prudent plain-
tiffs’ attorneys are likely to vigorously investigate their claims before filing
and to file detailed initial pleadings.47
41 ELLEN H. CEISLER & JAMES B. JORDAN, INTEGRITY & ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PHILA.
POLICE DEP’T, THIRD REPORT 28 (1999).
42 See JAMES G. KOLTS ET AL., THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT 56
(1992), available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/Special%20Reports/3%20-%20Kolts
%20Report%20-%20LASD.pdf.
43 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
44 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
45 For criticisms of these pleading standards and the burdens they impose on plain-
tiffs, see, for example, Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 43 (2010) (“It is uncertain how plaintiffs
with potentially meritorious claims are expected to plead with factual sufficiency without
the benefit of some discovery, especially when they are limited in terms of time or money,
or have no access to important information that often is in the possession of the defen-
dant, especially when the defendant denies access.” (footnote omitted)).
46 See, e.g., Leslie A. Gordon, For Federal Plaintiffs, Twombly and Iqbal Still Present a
Catch-22, ABA J., Jan. 1, 2011 (“Twombly and Iqbal are widely cited by defense lawyers as a
means of getting frivolous complaints dismissed before the costly factual discovery stage.”).
47 See Lori Andrus, In the Wake of Iqbal, 46 TRIAL 20, 22 (2010) (advising plaintiffs’
attorneys to “make every effort to include substantive factual allegations for every element
of every claim in the complaint”).  I recognize that these two benefits of Iqbal and Twombly
to organizational defendants are in some tension with each other.  If a plaintiff decides not
to file a case because it would be too difficult to satisfy this pleading standard, the organiza-
tional defendant will not have the benefit of learning from that case.  If a plaintiff does file
a case but it is dismissed for failing to satisfy the pleading standard, the organizational
defendant may still learn something from the complaint, but will not learn from any other
aspect of the litigation process.  Presumably, most defendants applaud Twombly and Iqbal
not because the decisions require plaintiffs to file detailed complaints but because the
decisions make it more difficult for plaintiffs to get to discovery; most would gladly forego
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Apart from the demands of Twombly and Iqbal, parties may file factually
detailed complaints for strategic reasons.  A plaintiff may decide to file a
detailed complaint so that the defendant must affirm or deny each of the
plaintiff’s allegations.48  A complaint with a compelling narrative may attract
the attention of the press; publicity about the case may pressure the defen-
dant to change practices or settle.49  A compelling complaint may also influ-
ence the opinion of the judge assigned to the case.50
Not all complaints will be detailed.  Attorneys may choose to keep allega-
tions general so that they cannot be contradicted during discovery or may
lack the skill or vision to present their clients’ cases in the most compelling
light.51  But even barebones pleadings offer some information about alleged
harms and the parties involved that may have fallen through the cracks of
other reporting systems.
B. Unearthing Details
Litigation can also unearth details about allegations of wrongdoing pre-
viously unknown to an organization’s leadership.  Organizations may have
procedures to investigate incidents internally when they occur.52  Outside
agencies also investigate some types of wrongdoing.53  Yet, in multiple set-
the benefit of learning from their errors if it meant that a suit was never filed or was
dismissed.
48 See, e.g., MARY BARNARD RAY & BARBARA J. COX, BEYOND THE BASICS: A TEXT FOR
ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING 255 (2d ed. 2003) (advising that detailed complaints may
“induce settlement negotiations and may require the defendant to admit or deny informa-
tion that will assist you with discovery”).
49 See Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Liti-
gators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 772 (1995) (“[T]hrough the media, the complaint speaks to the
greater community.  That community includes the defendants, the defendants’ superiors,
and possibly their friends and colleagues.  That community may come to see hidden
problems in a new light, consider change, and press for settlement.”); William H.J. Hub-
bard, A Theory of Pleading 6 (Univ. of Chi., Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. Research
Paper No. 663, Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 446, 2014), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2360723 (observing that a plaintiff has
“every incentive to signal the strength of her case [in her complaint] by communicating
her facts to the potential defendant, if doing so will encourage the defendant to settle”).
50 See Eastman, supra note 49, at 769–70 (arguing that pleadings should tell a compel-
ling story because in many cases the complaint is “the first and perhaps the only means of
communicating the client’s story” to a judge who is responsible for “managing a complex
discovery process, punctuated by scrimmages over various motions,” and facilitating
settlements).
51 See infra Section I.D (describing these and other characteristics of lawsuit com-
plaints that may make them less useful sources of information).
52 See generally Schlanger, supra note 2 (describing internal investigations in hospitals,
retailers, and jails and prisons).
53 See generally ANTON R. VALUKAS, JENNER & BLOCK, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY REGARDING IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS (May 29, 2014) (describ-
ing the investigation of an automobile defect by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA)).
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tings, organizations have learned important details about allegations of mis-
conduct through litigation discovery.54
One example of lawsuits’ power to unearth critical details concerns the
faulty ignition switch in Chevrolet Cobalts that has led to over a dozen deaths
and the recall of millions of cars by General Motors.55  The ignition switch,
first installed in Cobalts in 2002, caused cars to stall and lose power.56  In
2006, amid increasing reports of stalls and crashes, the company that manu-
factured the ignition switch proposed a redesign of the switch and a General
Motors engineer approved the change.57  The engineer reportedly did not
tell others within General Motors about the switch redesign and no steps
were taken to address faulty ignition switches in older cars.58  Later model
Cobalts, with the improved ignition switch, did not stall.  General Motors’
investigating engineers could not, however, figure out why different models
of Cobalts performed differently.59
The truth came to light during the litigation of a case brought by the
parents of Brooke Melton, a woman who died after she lost control of her
Chevy Cobalt, hit another car, and rolled off the road.60  Her parents sued
General Motors in 2011, and hired Mark Hood, a Florida engineer, to figure
out why Melton’s engine had suddenly shut off.61  Hood disassembled and
examined the ignition switch in Melton’s 2005 Cobalt and then compared it
to a newer ignition switch purchased at a local dealership.  Although both
ignition switches had the same identification number, there were significant
54 See, e.g., Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1287 (reporting that the vast
majority of risk managers and patient safety personnel surveyed reported that the informa-
tion that emerges during litigation discovery is “very useful” or “somewhat useful” in identi-
fying safety and quality concerns, and that discovery “often” or “sometimes” reveals new
and useful information); Schwartz, What Police Learn, supra note 10, at 872–73 (reporting
that when auditors compared closed litigation files to internal affairs investigations in Los
Angeles County, Seattle, Denver, and Portland, they found that litigation files were far
more complete); see also David E. Rapoport & Michael L. Teich, The Erosion of Secrecy in Air
Disaster Litigation, 10 ISSUES AVIATION L. & POL’Y 231, 232 (2011) (reporting that, despite
the NTSB’s sterling reputation, “pertinent facts are still often first discovered in adversarial
pretrial discovery in air disaster litigation”).
55 The most complete information to date about the ignition switch defect and Gen-
eral Motors’ failure to correct the defect for over a decade can be found in the report by
Anton R. Valukas, an attorney retained by the General Motors Board of Directors. See
generally VALUKAS, supra note 53 (describing the investigation of an automobile defect by
the NHTSA).
56 See id. at 1.
57 See id. at 100.
58 See id. at 100–01.
59 See id. at 3–4.
60 See Gregory Wallace et al., How Brooke Melton’s Death Led to the GM Recall, CNN
MONEY (June 4, 2014, 2:57 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/04/autos/general-
motors-melton-crash/.
61 Bill Vlasic, An Engineer’s Eureka Moment with a G.M. Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/business/a-florida-engineer-unlocked-the-mystery-
of-gms-ignition-flaw.html?_r=0.
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differences in design; the design of the newer ignition switch made it more
difficult for a driver to inadvertently cause a car to shut off power and disable
its airbags.62
Mark Hood’s comparison of faulty and functioning switches was, accord-
ing to Hood, “nothing extraordinary in scope”63—it is just the type of thing
that an expert retained in litigation is paid to do.  Yet investigators for Gen-
eral Motors and for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) had never taken the “basic investigative step[ ]” of disassembling
and comparing the ignition switches.64  Hood’s discovery of the changed
ignition switch notified the public, for the first time, of the reason Cobalts
and other cars were stalling.65  It also appears to have informed General
Motors management about the cause for the stalls; higher-ups in General
Motors maintain that they were unaware of the change to the faulty ignition
switch until it was discovered by Hood.66
Hood’s revelation is not unique; litigators in multiple settings have
unearthed valuable, previously unknown information by taking seemingly
straightforward steps overlooked by other investigators.  For example, in
2006, a Portland man named James Chasse died after a confrontation with
two Portland transit officers.67  The police department conducted an inter-
nal investigation and Chasse’s family filed a lawsuit; an outside expert then
reviewed both the internal investigation and the litigation file for possible
lessons.68  The outside expert found that the internal affairs investigators had
neglected to interview several officers who were at the scene and nurses who
saw Chasse at the jail.  The most significant deficiency, however, was the
internal affairs division’s failure to enhance a video taken the night of the
man’s death in which the involved officers were talking and reenacting the
incident.69  Although the audio portion of the recording was mostly unintel-
ligible, internal affairs did nothing to improve the sound.  Only during litiga-
tion did plaintiff’s counsel improve the audio, at which point it became clear
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 VALUKAS, supra note 53, at 4 (“While stumped by the inability to determine why
different model year Cobalts performed differently, the investigating engineers nonethe-
less failed to take certain basic investigative steps, such as taking apart both poorly and
properly functioning switches to compare the two.”).
65 See Vlasic, supra note 61.
66 See VALUKAS, supra note 53, at 4 (“While the issue of the ignition switch passed
through numerous hands at GM, from engineers to investigators to lawyers, nobody raised
the problem to the highest levels of the company.  As a result, those in the best position to
demand quick answers did not know questions needed to be asked.”).
67 See MICHAEL GENNACO ET AL., OIR GROUP, REPORT TO THE CITY OF PORTLAND CON-
CERNING THE IN-CUSTODY DEATH OF JAMES CHASSE 1 (2010), available at www.portlandonline
.com/auditor/index.cfm?a=310291&c=54263.
68 See generally id. (investigating the death of Mr. Chasse in a report completed by an
outside group commissioned by the city auditor).
69 See id. at 25–26.
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that the officer’s statement the night of Chasse’s death contradicted his state-
ment to internal affairs.70
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has been described
as the “the world’s gold standard in terms of accident investigation.”71  Yet,
despite its sterling reputation, the NTSB has overlooked key evidence
unearthed only during the litigation process.  After a Cessna aircraft crashed
in December 2004, the NTSB conducted an investigation but could not
determine the cause of the crash.72  When, in 2006, the NTSB released the
plane to the parties to a lawsuit filed by the family of the deceased pilot, two
experts examining the plane discovered a small hole in an oil line.73  Further
testing by the experts confirmed that the oil hose had been improperly
mounted and maintained, causing the oil hose to leak and the engine to
stall.74  The NTSB subsequently adopted the findings of the experts, conclud-
ing that the improperly placed and maintained oil hose had caused the
crash.75
There are at least three reasons why plaintiffs may unearth information
that has gone unnoticed by other investigators.  First, plaintiffs’ attorneys may
have more resources than other investigators to conduct a complete investi-
gation.  Commentators report that a wide range of investigations—including
those conducted by the NHTSA, police internal affairs divisions, and the
NTSB—have been compromised because investigators are underpaid, under-
staffed, and overworked.76
70 See id. at 27.
71 Christopher A. Hart, Vice Chairman, Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., Remarks at His
Swearing-In Ceremony (Dec. 17, 2009), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/news/speeches/
CHart/Pages/Hart_091217.aspx; see also Bob Wachter, The Crash of Air France 447: Lessons
for Patient Safety, WACHTER’S WORLD (Dec. 31, 2011), http://community.the-hospitalist
.org/2011/12/31/the-crash-of-air-france-447-lessons-for-patient-safety/ (describing data
collection about errors in aviation as the “true north” for hospital patient safety efforts).
72 See Michael Slack, Slack & Davis Attorneys Credited with Helping Determine Cause of Air-
plane Crash, SLACK & DAVIS (June 19, 2014), http://www.slackdavis.com/slack-davis-
credited-helping-determine-airplane-crash.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. In other instances, the NTSB has not adopted information unearthed during
litigation discovery that has proven convincing to judges and juries.  A study by USA Today
of NTSB’s investigations of small plane and helicopter crashes found “21 verdicts totaling
nearly $1 billion against manufacturers that the NTSB exonerated.”  Thomas Frank,
Unchecked Carnage: NTSB Probes Are Skimpy for Small-Aircraft Crashes, USA TODAY (June 12,
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/longform/news/nation/2014/06/12/unfit-for-flight-
part-2/10405451/.
76 See, e.g., CYNTHIS C. LEBOW ET AL., SAFETY IN THE SKIES: PERSONNEL AND PARTIES IN
NTSB AVIATION ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS 45–46 (1999) (finding that the NTSB’s investiga-
tions are compromised by underfunding, understaffing, and outdated investigatory tech-
niques); G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator’s View of Discovery and Proof in Police Misconduct Policy and
Practice Cases, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 747, 756 (1999) (observing that, among other limitations
of police internal affairs investigations, “[t]he salaries paid may not be sufficiently competi-
tive to attract competent investigators . . . [t]he agency may be understaffed for the volume
of work at hand, and the resultant backloads may be a cause of shoddy, pro forma investi-
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Plaintiffs’ attorneys are more likely to have the time and money to
uncover all evidence that might help win their clients’ cases.  As Peter Schuck
has observed, “lawyers have every incentive to demand as much existing
information from the defendants as the discovery rules, the judge or discov-
ery master, and their photocopying budgets will allow.”77  Plaintiffs’ attor-
neys’ may not uncover every relevant piece of evidence that exists; as
Schuck’s comment about the limits of an attorney’s photocopying budget
implies, lawyers and clients may well make cost-benefit analyses about how
aggressive to be during discovery.78  But competent counsel79 will only pur-
sue cases in which they have the resources to unearth the evidence necessary
to prove their client’s claims.  Shifts in litigation finance mean that both sides
are more likely to be evenly matched: Although the defense bar has long had
a financial advantage, the increasingly well-financed plaintiffs’ bar is better
able than ever before to engage in lengthy and costly discovery.80
Second, plaintiffs’ attorneys may be more motivated than other investi-
gators to uncover evidence of misconduct.  Internal investigators may con-
duct perfunctory investigations in order to protect81 or avoid retribution
gations”); Christopher Jensen & Matthew L. Wald, Carmakers’ Close Ties to Regulator Scruti-
nized, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/31/business/
carmakers-close-ties-to-regulator-scrutinized.html (observing that the NHTSA may be less
effective than it could be because of a shortage of investigators).
77 Peter H. Schuck, Why Regulating Guns Through Litigation Won’t Work, in SUING THE
GUN INDUSTRY 225, 233 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005).
78 See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and Delay to
the Markets in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 597, 605 (1998) (observing that
“lawyers in the ordinary cases have learned how to manage time and expense” because
“their clients will not pay for scorched earth tactics”).
79 Less competent counsel may fail to make these types of cost-benefit calculations
before taking the case. See infra Section I.D (describing these and other reasons that not
all lawsuits generate valuable information).
80 See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Katherine Lehe, Uncovering Discovery, 12 SEDONA
CONF. J. 1, 26 (2011) (describing how plaintiffs’ lawyers work together “essentially as ad hoc
law firms” and, by doing so, “overcame the limitations of the contingent fee economic
model (small firm size/litigation underfunding) to achieve economies of scale, and amass
a sizeable costs fund with which to counteract attrition tactics”); Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-
Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 195 (2001) (observing that the modern
plaintiffs’ bar has “recapitaliz[ed] themselves to the point where they could take cases deep
enough into discovery to realize some of the potential gain from such pretrial prepara-
tion”); id. at 198–205 (describing in detail factors that have recapitalized the plaintiffs’
bar).
81 See ROBERT M. WACHTER & KAVEH G. SHOJANIA, INTERNAL BLEEDING: THE TRUTH
BEHIND AMERICA’S TERRIFYING EPIDEMIC OF MEDICAL MISTAKES 322 (2004) (suggesting that
hospitals may sometimes “protect their own . . . at the expense of patients”); Samuel
Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department “Pattern or Prac-
tice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 34–35 (2003) (observing that police
“[i]nvestigations have been compromised by too intimate a relationship between investiga-
tors and officers, a failure of the department to respond to force incidents in a timely
fashion (which may result in the loss of witnesses or physical evidence), the failure to
report incidents to the top command or other authorities, the collusion of officers for the
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from82 their fellow employees.  Outside investigators, like those employed by
the NHTSA to investigate stalls in Chevrolet Cobalts or those employed by
the NTSB to investigate the 2004 Cessna crash, may have allegiances to the
industry that they are employed to regulate.83  Senator Claire McKaskill, in a
recent hearing about the General Motors defect, despaired that the NHTSA
was “more interested in singing ‘Kumbaya’ with the manufacturers than
being a cop on the beat.”84  As a result, information generated through inter-
nal investigations or investigations by regulators can be geared toward pro-
tecting organizational interests at the expense of a full and fair examination
of the event.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys, in contrast, have no allegiances to those
they are suing.  Instead, they are highly motivated to uncover all material that
supports their position—and harms that of the defendants—both to defeat
any motion for summary judgment and to prevail at trial.
The third reason that litigants may unearth previously unknown infor-
mation during discovery is because litigation discovery rules allow for the
production of a broader range of information.  Some investigative bodies are
limited in the types of information they can seek and the manner in which
they can seek that information.  Police department internal investigations,
for example, may be constrained by state and local laws, union agreements,
and department policies.  Some departments suspend internal affairs investi-
gations if a lawsuit is filed regarding the alleged misconduct.85  Some depart-
ments limit the amount of time that can be spent conducting an
investigation: Louisiana state law requires that most police internal investiga-
tions be completed within sixty days.86  Some departments limit the ways in
which employees can be questioned: the Chicago Police Department’s inter-
nal affairs investigators give officers a week or longer to respond to questions
purpose [sic] agreeing on a common and exculpatory version of the incident, and the lack
of supervisory attention to critical incidents”).
82 See Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983
Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 85 (2000) (observing that a 1992 study of the Boston
Police Department found that “investigators refused to volunteer for the Internal Affairs
Division ‘because they fear[ed] retribution once they [got back on the street]’” (altera-
tions in original) (quoting another source)).
83 See, e.g., Jensen & Wald, supra note 76 (describing the fear that the “revolving door
between the [NHTSA] and the automotive industry” may cause the agency to be less
aggressive in its investigations); Nicholas Schmidle, Crime Fiction, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 4,
2014, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/crime-fiction
(observing that the Illinois State’s Attorney’s Conviction Integrity Unit, charged with inves-
tigating claims of false convictions, may “resist rigorous reviews” because of “‘relationship
issues’ flowing from the office’s ‘heavy reliance’ on the testimony of officers”).
84 Hilary Stout & Aaron M. Kessler, Senators Take Auto Agency to Task over G.M. Recall,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/business/senate-hear-
ing-on-nhtsa-and-recalls.html.
85 See Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics, supra note 10, at 1049 (describing this practice in
Philadelphia).
86 NEW ORLEANS, supra note 33, at 80.
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and allow officers to respond to those questions in writing.87  Investigators
may also lack the power to compel information they seek; if a witness refuses
to disclose documents or feigns ignorance in an interview there may be little
an investigator can do.88
In contrast, litigation discovery allows parties to seek out any informa-
tion that “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.”89  While a police officer may be allowed to respond to an internal
investigator’s questions in writing, the officer, once named as a defendant in
a civil suit, will be required to respond to questions in a day-long deposition
where he is sworn and attorneys cannot—except under very limited circum-
stances—intervene.  When a party refuses to disclose relevant evidence dur-
ing litigation, opposing counsel can seek a motion to compel.90  When a
party suppresses or destroys evidence, opposing counsel can seek sanctions.91
Internal investigators are less likely to have (or use) comparable powers to
overcome and punish obstructionist behavior.  For any of these reasons, an
important document sitting in a dusty file cabinet may be unearthed only
when a discovery request demands its production.
C. Marshaling the Evidence
Throughout litigation, parties marshal and interpret available evidence
in ways that can prove illuminating.  When drafting a complaint, plaintiffs
gather relevant evidence and frame defendants’ conduct as a violation of the
law.92  After discovery, attorneys scour incident reports, emails, internal
memos, and deposition transcripts for facts that support or undermine (or,
at times, transform) their legal theories.  Attorneys evaluate the strength of
the inferences connecting those unearthed documents and statements to the
legal propositions they are trying to prove.  Then, in summary judgment
motions, settlement letters, pretrial orders and arguments before the jury,
each side shows how their curated collections of facts support their legal
claims and defenses.  Experts also perform a marshaling function, evaluating
documents and deposition transcripts to form an opinion about the extent of
liability or harm.93
87 Craig B. Futterman et al., The Use of Statistical Evidence to Address Police Supervisory and
Disciplinary Practices: The Chicago Police Department’s Broken System, 1 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 251,
275 (2008).
88 See Wagner, supra note 7, at 699 (observing that many agencies do not have sub-
poena power and those that do may not use it because “[t]he fear of political backlash, the
agencies’ limited resources, and more invisible political pressures all likely work to temper
the agencies’ use of these information-production authorities”).
89 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
90 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3).
91 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b).
92 See Stephen C. Yeazell, Convention, Fiction, and Law, 13 NEW LITERARY HIST. 89, 92
(1982) (observing that, by “sorting complaints into contract, negligence, fraud, battery,
and the like,” a lawsuit “helps the reader to organize the story”).
93 For evidence about the prevalence of experts in civil litigation, see Samuel R. Gross,
Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113.  Professor Gross found that experts testified in 86%
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Organizations may also analyze information available to them to deter-
mine whether they are meeting internal goals or legal standards.  This pro-
cess might occur as part of the organization’s risk management efforts or
regulatory protocols.  Yet, an organization’s internal analyses may be focused
on answering questions different than those posed in litigation.  And even
when internal analyses and litigation address the same issues, the plaintiff
may interpret the evidence in a manner more sympathetic to her position.94
As a result, when litigants marshal evidence, they may be reflecting that infor-
mation back to the defendants in novel ways.
Take, for example, a recent case brought against the Los Angeles Sher-
iff’s Department by three individuals arrested at different times and locations
by deputies for taking photographs in public spaces.95  The Department pre-
sumably knew about each of the arrests from the reports deputies filled out
in each case.  And the Department—or the district attorney’s office—pre-
sumably began some manner of investigation based on these reports.  But the
civil complaint created a connection between the arrests, framed these
arrests as violations of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, and contended
that the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department had a policy of infringing on art-
ists’ constitutional rights.  In bringing a single civil case on behalf of the
three plaintiffs, the complaint alleged a connection between these events and
framed the wrongdoing as a violation of the First Amendment.
Organizations, named as defendants in civil litigation, can also learn val-
uable information in the process of marshaling evidence they already possess.
One such example comes from research by Timothy Lytton about the sex
abuse scandal in the Catholic Church.96  Lytton credits clergy sex abuse liti-
gation with publicly revealing “hidden (or merely hard to access) informa-
tion” about the extent of the abuse and framing the abuse as an institutional
failure.97  Clergy sex abuse litigation also appears to have marshaled diffuse
information previously unknown to church officials.  As part of a mediation
process with plaintiffs’ attorneys, the Archdiocese of Los Angeles in 2004
compiled a report detailing 244 sexual abuse allegations against priests that
marked a turning point in its response to sexual abuse allegations.98  As Lyt-
ton writes, “[i]t is highly unlikely that this information would have been col-
lected, organized, and disclosed in the absence of litigation.”99
of the civil trials sampled from California state courts in 1985 and 1986, with an average of
3.3 experts per trial. Id. at 1119.
94 See Timothy D. Lytton, Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation: The Policymaking Role of Tort
Law, 39 CONN. L. REV. 809 (2007) (describing this as the “framing” function of litigation).
95 See Complaint, Nee v. Cnty. of L.A., No. CV11-08899DDP(JCGx), 2011 WL 5121137
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011).
96 See generally LYTTON, supra note 2, at 175 (2008) (arguing that “[i]nformation gener-
ated by litigation may prove crucial” to efforts by the Vatican to screen candidates for the
priesthood).
97 Id. at 138.
98 See id. at 155 (describing the report).
99 See id.
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Expert reports can also marshal evidence that defendants possess but
have not previously analyzed.  Take, for example, the expert reports in Ingles
v. Toro, a class action lawsuit filed against the New York City Department of
Corrections (DOC) in 2002, alleging widespread, excessive force against pris-
oners and inadequate supervision and discipline of officers.100  Twenty-two
individual plaintiffs sought damages for injuries received at DOC facilities
and sought systemic reform of officer training, supervision, investigation, and
discipline on behalf of a class of prisoners.101
Plaintiffs hired two corrections experts to evaluate whether there was a
pattern of excessive force applied against DOC prisoners.102  To answer this
question, the experts reviewed thousands of use of force reports, hundreds of
use of force investigations, and department manuals and policies, all of
which were produced by defendants.  Plaintiffs’ experts also reviewed deposi-
tion transcripts of DOC employees.  In addition, plaintiffs’ experts visited the
corrections facilities at issue in the case.103  Plaintiffs’ experts found several
patterns in DOC use-of-force incident reports: officers repeatedly used force
against prisoners in isolated areas of the jail facilities; officers disproportion-
ately used force against mentally ill prisoners; and officers often unnecessa-
rily hit prisoners in the face.  Plaintiffs’ experts analyzed patterns in the
narratives in officer-reported uses of force and found that officers justified
uses of force with “recurring boilerplate scenarios” that suggested not only
improper uses of force but also false reporting.104  The reports also sug-
gested inadequate supervision; supervisory staff should have but did not
intervene, both to address officers’ use of excessive force and their blatant
false reporting.
Although the use-of-force reports and investigation files relied upon by
plaintiffs’ experts were in defendants’ possession, the DOC had never
engaged in this type of analysis.  DOC leadership had monthly and yearly
records of the total numbers of use-of-force events and injuries, divided (by
severity) into “use of force A” events and “use of force B” events, and class A
and B injuries.  But the DOC did not track information about the precise
nature of injury, the location of use-of-force events, or the type of force
used.105  Even when one facility did start using a pushpin map to identify
where use-of-force incidents occurred, they took down the pins each month
with no effort “to retain or analyze the information.”106  Although the DOC
analyzed security-related data to identify patterns of wrongdoing by prison-
100 See Fourth Amended Complaint at 5, Ingles v. Toro, No. 01 CIV 8279 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
11, 2003).
101 See id.
102 See generally Report of Plaintiffs’ Expert Steve J. Martin, Ingles v. Toro, No. 01 CIV
8279 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Martin Report]; Report of Plaintiffs’ Expert
Vincent M. Nathan, Ingles v. Toro, No. 01 CIV 8279 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2004) [hereinafter
Nathan Report].
103 See Martin Report, supra note 102, at 9.
104 See Nathan Report, supra note 102, at 10.
105 See id. at 23, 24, 240.
106 See id.
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ers,107 it did not use these same techniques to uncover patterns in force used
against prisoners.108  It was only through the litigation process that these pat-
terns were revealed.
D. The Limits of Litigation Information
By announcing previously unknown allegations of wrongdoing, unearth-
ing details of allegations, and marshaling evidence, litigants can bring infor-
mation to the attention of organizational leaders and cause them
affirmatively to know something previously unknown, ignored, or unap-
preciated.  I do not, however, mean to suggest that lawsuits are an ideal
medium through which to understand organizational performance.  Law-
suits—like all other sources of information—have limitations and flaws.
The volume of lawsuits filed is, for example, a poor indicator of the fre-
quency with which defendants engage in misconduct.  Although proponents
of tort reform may argue that there are too many lawsuits,109 the weight of
empirical evidence indicates that very few people who have been harmed
ever sue.110  In addition, the amount that a plaintiff recovers may depend
more on the degree of her injury than the severity of the defendant’s miscon-
107 See id. at 35–36 (observing that the Department of Correction’s statistical reports
“contain information relating to drug discovery locations, weapon discovery locations,
escape contraband locations, and place of occurrence for infractions” but do not contain
information “with respect to the location of reported or alleged uses of force . . . in stark
contrast to the collection of a host of other security-related data the department
maintains”).
108 See id. (“I am at a loss to understand why none of this information [regarding uses
of force by staff] so readily available from reports prepared at the jail is collected, reviewed,
and used by central office managers to identify problematic trends in use of force in the
jails.”).
109 See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093,
1095 (1996) (describing the prevailing view that “there are too many tort claims: Ameri-
cans sue too readily, ‘at the drop of a hat’; egged on by avaricious lawyers, they overwhelm
our congested courts with mounting numbers of suits, including many frivolous claims”).
110 See, e.g., PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUB-
LIC POLICY 23–24 (1985) (finding that ten percent of victims of medical malpractice sued);
MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CON-
TACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC: FINDINGS FROM THE 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY 16–20
(2005) (finding that the police had used force against 664,500 people, 87.3% of whom
(580,108) believed that the police acted improperly, and just 1.3% of whom (7416) filed a
lawsuit regarding the alleged misconduct); DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 121 (1991)
(finding that lawsuits were filed in 44% of vehicle injuries, in 7% of work injuries, and less
frequently in other types of claims); A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice
Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325
NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 249 (1991) (reporting that “the fraction of medical negligence that
leads to claims is probably under 2 percent”); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances,
Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 544 (1981)
(showing that 5% of grievances became filed lawsuits).
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duct.111  Accordingly, the volume of lawsuits filed likely understates the fre-
quency with which defendants commit errors, and damages awarded to a
plaintiff may overstate or understate the severity of defendants’ conduct,
depending on the nature of the plaintiff’s injury.
The inaccuracies of filing rates and disposition amounts can be attrib-
uted to the dynamics of modern civil litigation.  Because plaintiffs generally
pay their lawyers by the hour or on contingency, a plaintiff will decide to
sue—and a lawyer will decide to take her case—only when the likely benefits
of a remedy exceed the costs of pursuing the case.  If a person’s injuries are
minimal, she would be an unsympathetic plaintiff, or if the legal claim would
require extensive discovery, a person who has been wronged or her lawyer
might conclude it is not financially viable to bring her case.112  And because
compensatory damages are calculated based on the extent of plaintiffs’ inju-
ries, settlements and judgments may not reflect the severity of defendants’
misconduct.  Egregious malpractice that shortens the life of an elderly
patient by one day will garner a low settlement (if the case is brought at all).
A far higher settlement is likely in a case with professionally marginal con-
duct that causes a severely compromised child to need lifetime care.
Some of the flaws in lawsuit data are caused by litigants who—intention-
ally or inadvertently—distort the information generated during litigation.  A
lawyer might file a complaint that includes few details, either to preserve the
opportunity to pursue multiple theories during discovery and trial, or
because he lacks the skill, time, or motivation to tell the plaintiff’s story in a
compelling manner.113  A lawyer might, alternatively, overstate the wrongs
111 See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securi-
ties Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (finding that awards are calculated based on
plaintiff’s injuries); David A. Hyman, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System: What Do We
Know and What (if Anything) Should We Do About It?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1639, 1642–44 (2002)
(describing studies in malpractice and other contexts that show “the best predictor of the
size of an award is the severity of disability, not whether there was negligence or an adverse
event”).
112 Scholars have offered these and other reasons to explain why wronged plaintiffs
may decide not to pursue litigation. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 109, at 1099 (hypothesiz-
ing that people are unlikely to file lawsuits if “they think the injury is de minimis; they want
to get on with their lives; they are wary of the cost of pursuing claims; or they simply do not
know how to pursue the matter”); Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law
Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
247, 284 (1988) (suggesting that people who are victims of police misconduct might not
sue because of “ignorance of their rights, poverty, fear of police reprisals, or the burdens of
incarceration” (footnotes omitted)); Miller & Sarat, supra note 110, at 540 (hypothesizing
that “people do not make claims unless they feel confident that something can be done
should the claim be accepted”).
113 See, e.g., CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 366 (5th ed. 2006)
(advising that lawyers should draft their complaints with “the maximum generality
allowed” in order to avoid allegations that “might prematurely commit the plaintiff to a
particular factual theory of the case”); Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments on
Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 518–19 (1957) (“Adept
pleaders are reluctant to reveal their position in too precise a form early in the litigation—
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suffered by his client in the complaint or file a meritless case.114  A lawyer
may not hire a key expert because he did not think to do so, or because he
did not have the money to do so.  During a deposition, an attorney may ask
questions that distort the witness’s testimony, or may fail to ask a critical ques-
tion that would unearth key information.  In his summary judgment brief, an
attorney may marshal evidence in ways that misconstrue the record.  Our
adversarial system is premised on the notion that a neutral factfinder is best
equipped to determine the truth after hearing from equally matched, zealous
advocates.115  Yet when adversaries have unequal amounts of money or skill,
the information generated during litigation may well favor the party with the
most resources regardless of the underlying merits of the case.116
Critics of lawsuits as a mode of regulation have raised a number of addi-
tional concerns about lawsuit data.  Lawsuits may not focus on the issues most
relevant to an organization interested in understanding and improving its
performance.117  Because each case takes so long to resolve, lawsuits may
generate out-of-date information.118  Finally, some fear that the threat of liti-
gation will cause employees to hide relevant information.119  Commentators
often because it is not then clear what evidence will be produced at the trial—and inept
pleaders may be unable to do so.”).
114 Note, however, that even a case without legal merit may reveal information of inter-
est and use to organizational leaders. See, e.g., Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at
1283 (describing the value to hospitals of lawsuits that do not meet the standards for medi-
cal negligence).
115 For descriptions of this conventional view of the role of the adversarial system, see
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 15 (2000); Sharon Dolovich, Ethical Lawy-
ering and the Possibility of Integrity, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1634 (2002).
116 See Schwartz, What Police Learn, supra note 10, at 876–77 (describing the distortions
that may result when adversaries in litigation are not evenly resourced or skilled).
117 See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Contracting over Liability: Medical Malpractice and the Cost of
Choice, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 957, 987–88 (2010) (“Although many errors are attributable to
hospitals’ administrative systems, patients generally cannot recover for injuries resulting
from systems problems unless they can identify an individual act of negligence.  As a result,
hospitals do not have adequate incentives to make systemic investments to reduce the risk
of error.”); Schuck, supra note 77, at 235 (noting that a regulator “might want to know
about the industry’s revenues, costs, and profits in order to assess the feasibility of alterna-
tive policy interventions, yet this kind of economic information might be inadmissible in a
tort case where the issue is whether and how the defendant harmed the plaintiff”).  Note,
however, that this is not always the case; lawsuits sometimes concern allegations of wrong-
doing highly relevant to policymakers that internal systems simply are not designed to col-
lect. See supra notes 22–32 and accompanying text.
118 For discussions of these critiques and the value of lawsuit data despite the time
delay, see Schwartz, What Police Learn, supra note 10, at 883–84.  Note, also, that the time
delay inherent in the litigation process can sometimes be a benefit. See Schwartz, A Dose of
Reality, supra note 10, at 1281 (observing that the time delay inherent in litigation makes
lawsuits better suited to capture allegations of delayed treatment, delayed diagnoses, and
misdiagnoses).
119 See ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON’S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT SCIENCE
57 (2002) (describing the negative effects of litigation on the openness and transparency
needed to improve patient safety); Schuck, supra note 77, at 233–34 (“[I]t is quite plausible
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have debated the strengths of these criticisms of lawsuits as a source of infor-
mation about organizational performance.120  Further research could
endeavor to pinpoint the manner and extent to which each of these limita-
tions of lawsuit data influence the information lawsuits generate.  We can
accept, for the purpose of discussion, that lawsuit data has each of these flaws
to at least some degree.
It would, however, be a mistake to disregard lawsuit data altogether
because of these limitations.  All information is impacted by the manner in
which it is produced, the interests of those producing the information, and
the intended use of the information.  Prudent review of information there-
fore recognizes and accommodates those effects.  Notably, the organizations
I have studied that gather and analyze litigation data appear to do so in two
ways that take account of the limitations of lawsuits as a source of informa-
tion.  First, organizations that gather and analyze litigation data discount the
information most prone to distortion.  For example, both hospitals and
police departments distrust payouts as a source of information about organi-
zational behavior.  To be sure, organizations may take note when clusters of
settlements and judgments indicate problematic practices, personnel, and
units.121  But those charged with improving performance are skeptical of law-
suit outcomes as an indication of the severity of misconduct.122
Second, organizations gather information from multiple sources—not
only lawsuits—when identifying problem personnel, practices, and units and
to suppose that litigation, or the prospect of it, may actually discourage the gun industry
from undertaking new risk-related research [because] . . . any new information that the
research might yield . . . would likely be used by gun control groups to press for expanded
civil liability or government regulation . . . .”); Schwartz, What Police Learn, supra note 10, at
885–87 (describing the blaming culture allegedly created by litigation). But see BAKER,
supra note 7, at 97 (reviewing available research about medical injuries and finding “no
research testing the conventional wisdom that medical malpractice lawsuits drive medical
mistakes underground”); Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1230 (finding evi-
dence that lawsuits do not necessarily inhibit open discussion and transparency in hospi-
tals).  Note that lawsuits may also contribute to the creation of policy-relevant information.
See generally Schlanger, supra note 2 (observing that the threat of litigation can cause orga-
nizations to implement claims management procedures, including the collection and
assessment of information, that can lead to performance improvements).
120 See supra notes 117–19 (describing literature that both sets out and challenges these
criticisms of lawsuits).
121 See, e.g., Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1274–75 (describing closed
claims reviews across multihospital systems to identify settlement trends); Schwartz, What
Police Learn, supra note 10, at 854–55 (describing an analysis by the Los Angeles Sheriff’s
Department indicating that two stations were responsible for sixty percent of settlement
dollars paid over a six-month period, and the resulting in-depth investigation of the under-
lying causes for those payouts).
122 See Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1293 (describing hospital risk man-
agers’ skepticism about lawsuit payouts as a source of information about medical errors);
Schwartz, What Police Learn, supra note 10, at 882–83 (reporting that those engaged in
police department performance improvement efforts pay little attention to lawsuit
outcomes).
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determining how best to address the problems they identify.123  Scholars
have long recognized that it is valuable to gather information from redun-
dant or overlapping sources.124  By reviewing data from multiple sources,
organizations can get a fuller picture of their strengths and weaknesses; if a
problem is reported through an internal information system but not a law-
suit, the organization will still have a record of the alleged problem.125  Orga-
nizations can also use multiple data sources to check the integrity of
information generated by each system; if previously unknown details of a doc-
tor’s wrongdoing emerge during a medical malpractice lawsuit, the hospital
can assess whether internal reporting systems should have captured this
information—or whether the details of the doctor’s behavior have been dis-
torted by the litigation process.  Either way, the organization’s review of data
from multiple sources can improve the integrity of information ultimately
relied upon when making personnel and policy decisions intended to reduce
future harms.
E. The Case for Introspection
Thus far, I have shown that litigation data can fill gaps in organizations’
internal information systems and that the weaknesses of litigation data can be
addressed through thoughtful collection and analysis.  I now take the short
leap from descriptive to prescriptive and make the case for organizations
interested in learning about and improving their performance to engage in
123 See Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1292–93 (describing the various
sources of data gathered and analyzed by hospital risk managers); id. at 1262–63, 1269
(describing investigations of medical errors that are prompted by, but independent of,
medical malpractice lawsuits); Schwartz, What Police Learn, supra note 10, at 877 (describ-
ing the multiple sources of data analyzed in police early intervention systems); id. at 878
(describing a review of a Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department station that was prompted by a
series of lawsuits but focused on staffing and management issues that went beyond the
allegations in the suits).
124 See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY DO IT 274 (1989) (“In some governmental systems as in many mechanical ones,
redundancy is useful.  Overlapping agencies, like back-up computers on the space shuttle,
can detect errors; duplicating functions is not always wasteful, it can lead to more flexible
responses and generate alternatives.”); Martin Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the
Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346 (1969) (describing the benefits
of overlapping and redundant systems in complex organizations); Matthew C. Stephenson,
Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1463 (2011)
(“Redundant systems are thought to act as a form of insurance: if one agent fails in her
task, another agent’s contributions may compensate.  Furthermore, if agents’ contribu-
tions are partial rather than perfect substitutes (that is, if the agents’ functions overlap but
are not fully redundant), then the contributions from multiple agents may add value to the
final outcome even if none of them shirk.”).
125 See supra text accompanying note 124 (describing the benefits of redundant or over-
lapping information collection); see also Levtzion-Korach et al.,  supra note 28 (describing
the importance of collecting information about medical error from multiple sources to
counteract the weaknesses of each data source).
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introspection through litigation.  It is, however, as this discussion will make
clear, a relatively modest case and one that is qualified in several respects.
The case for introspection is straightforward: when organizations review
lawsuits for lessons they can better understand weaknesses in personnel, man-
agement, and policies, and craft interventions to address those weaknesses.
In multiple organizational settings, lawsuits have announced previously
unknown allegations of wrongdoing, unearthed critical details about those
events, and marshaled evidence in illuminating ways.  Examples abound of
instances in which information revealed during litigation has led to reduc-
tions in errors and improvements in care.  When one hospital tracked law-
suits, it discovered that it had a cluster of pulmonary embolism cases and
implemented several interventions that the hospital risk manager reported
were “hugely effective” at reducing injuries and claims.126  When one police
department tracked lawsuits, it found a cluster of excessive force cases involv-
ing head injuries brought against officers working the night shift at one sta-
tion.127  Following retraining and closer supervision, head strikes—and
associated lawsuits—declined.128  The discovery by an engineering expert in
a suit against General Motors that the Chevrolet Cobalt’s ignition switch had
been surreptitiously changed to reduce the likelihood of stalls “set in motion
G.M.’s worldwide recall of 2.6 million Cobalts and other cars, and one of the
gravest safety crises in the company’s history.”129
Although introspection through litigation has undoubtedly helped dif-
ferent types of organizations understand and address their weaknesses, I can-
not calculate with any precision the contribution that lawsuits have made to
these performance improvement efforts.  Organizations that analyze lawsuits
for lessons consider that information in connection with information from
multiple other sources.  Given the flaws of lawsuits as a source of information
about organizational performance, and the flaws of the other types of data
available to organizations, it makes good sense for organizations to seek out
information from overlapping and redundant sources.130  It does, however,
make it difficult to determine the precise value added by lawsuits.
Moreover, the value of lawsuit data to organizational improvement
efforts likely differs from organization to organization and depends on the
types of harms caused by its employees, the types of claims that can be
brought in court, the other types of information collected by the organiza-
tion, and the strength and integrity of those other information systems.  Pre-
sumably, organizations with the weakest internal information systems—like
police departments—will benefit most from introspection through litigation.
Yet lawsuits have also surfaced information of value to organizations with
more comprehensive information systems, like hospitals.  Lawsuits have
revealed valuable information even to the auto and aviation industries, each
126 See Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1285–86.
127 See Schwartz, What Police Learn, supra note 10, at 854–55.
128 See id.
129 Vlasic, supra note 61.
130 See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
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of which have government-run investigative bodies overseeing their conduct.
Accordingly, even organizations with robust systems for collecting and inves-
tigating possible misconduct learn lessons from lawsuits that can contribute
to organizational performance improvement efforts.
In encouraging organizations to engage in introspection through litiga-
tion, I do not mean to suggest that litigation is the only way for organizations
to learn about and address their weaknesses.  Organizations can work to
improve their other information systems.  Indeed, organizations can
endeavor to adjust their information systems so that they capture some of the
same information generated by lawsuits.  Such adjustments could, conceiva-
bly, reduce the value of lawsuit data to those organizations.  If, for example,
hospitals created incident reporting systems better designed to identify
delayed and missed diagnoses, hospitals would less frequently learn about
such claims through litigation.  If the NTSB reduced their investigators’
caseloads, critical evidence about aviation accidents might not surface for the
first time during discovery.  Yet litigation has several qualities that would be
difficult for an organization to replicate: plaintiffs and their attorneys are
completely independent of the organizations they sue, have strong financial
and other incentives to unearth damaging information about those organiza-
tions, and can use discovery rules to ensure they will get the information they
seek.  Given these unique qualities of litigation, it is difficult to imagine that
organizations’ other information systems can be adjusted so dramatically that
they eliminate the value of lawsuit information altogether.
Litigation is also an economical means of learning about organizational
behavior.  To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that litigation itself is inex-
pensive.131  But the current structure of our civil litigation system already
requires parties to spend the money necessary to announce claims of wrong-
doing, unearth critical details of those claims, and marshal the evidence they
find.  These costs will be borne by the parties to a suit regardless of whether
the information is also used for performance improvement efforts.  After
spending the time and money necessary to defend against a suit, it is rela-
tively inexpensive for a defendant to review the information generated dur-
ing that suit for lessons.
II. WHY SOME ORGANIZATIONS ARE INTROSPECTIVE
(AND OTHERS ARE NOT)
Although lawsuits have revealed previously unknown, useful information
in multiple, varied organizational settings, not all organizations review law-
suits for lessons.  There is very limited research—beyond my studies of police
131 There are, of course, ongoing debates about whether lawsuits are too expensive and
time-consuming, whether procedural reforms are necessary to address the pathologies of
modern civil litigation, and what those reforms should be.  I do not intend to engage here
in those ongoing debates.  For the purposes of this Article, I focus on what organizations
can learn from the information generated by our civil litigation system as it is currently
structured.
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departments and hospitals—examining the frequency with which organiza-
tions gather and analyze lawsuits for lessons.132  Yet, even in these two organi-
zational settings, there is wide variation in this regard.
Police departments have highly flawed internal information systems—
and could, therefore, one imagines, learn a great deal from lawsuits—yet very
few police departments appear to systematically gather and analyze lawsuit
data.  High profile cases may capture the attention of law enforcement offi-
cials, but run-of-the-mill cases are largely ignored: most departments make
little effort to gather and analyze data about which officers are sued, what
claims are alleged, what evidence is unearthed, whether plaintiffs prevail, and
how much they recover.133  A growing number of police departments have
computerized systems to track problem police officers, but do not necessarily
include lawsuit claims in those systems.134  And departments rarely use law-
suits to identify problem practices or stations, rarely analyze information
gathered during discovery, and rarely review closed cases for lessons.135
In contrast, hospitals—despite more extensive internal systems for
reporting and analyzing error—report reviewing lawsuits for lessons far more
often than do police departments.136  Thirty years ago, few hospitals viewed
medical malpractice cases as a source of information relevant to patient
132 For one study that does touch on this topic, see GEORGE EADS & PETER REUTER,
DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULA-
TION 107 (1983) (observing, in a study of the effects of product liability litigation, that
“firms viewed product liability litigation as essentially a random influence” and that “two
firms with the largest volume of litigation took steps to insulate design decisions from the
influence of litigation”).  For additional scholarship that considers this question, see supra
note 2.
133 See Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics, supra note 10, at 1041–52 (describing these find-
ings); see also SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT
100–01 (2001) (“One of the notable failures of both police departments and other city
officials has been their neglect of modern concepts of risk management and in particular
their refusal to examine incidents that result in litigation and seek to correct the underly-
ing problems.”).
134 See Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics, supra note 10, at 1059 n.214 (observing that, as of
2003, two-thirds of law enforcement agencies in jurisdictions with populations over 50,000
did not have early intervention systems, and those that did may not have included lawsuits
in the data they collect).
135 See SAMUEL WALKER & CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTA-
BILITY 48 (2d ed. 2014) (observing that some of the practices described in What Police Learn,
including early intervention systems, “are already being done” but others, “such as revisit-
ing closed cases for relevant information about officers’ conduct, are not known to be
currently done but are a creative suggestion for the future”); Schwartz, Myths and Mechan-
ics, supra note 10, at 1058–59 (describing the infrequency with which departments analyze
trends in suits, review litigation discovery, or review closed cases); Schwartz, What Police
Learn, supra note 10, at 847 (observing that the five police departments that gather and
analyze litigation data are outliers, in that they “review litigation data most extensively as a
matter of policy and most consistently as a matter of practice” (footnote omitted)).
136 See Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1252 (reporting that fewer than five
percent of participants in my survey of hospital risk managers and patient safety personnel
reported “never” or “rarely” using litigation data for patient safety and quality purposes).
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safety.  Today, however, hospitals gather and analyze information from every
stage of litigation to help understand weaknesses and improve the quality of
care.  The vast majority of hospitals investigate the allegations in malpractice
complaints not only to prepare a defense but also to identify possible patient
safety issues.137  Most hospitals analyze lawsuit claims in the aggregate to
identify case trends that might signal weaknesses in personnel or proto-
cols.138  Hospital risk managers, medical providers, and other personnel
receive updates about pending malpractice cases, and information
unearthed during the course of discovery may inform patient safety initia-
tives.139  Most hospitals also report reviewing closed malpractice claim files—
containing both litigation documents and internal records—for lessons.140
Why do most police departments ignore lawsuits as a source of informa-
tion while most hospitals integrate litigation data into their patient safety
efforts?  The very nature of this question, as I have posed it, demands that any
answer rely heavily on generalities.141  Nevertheless, this Part offers some pre-
liminary answers to this question.  It seems reasonable to assume that an
organization would only engage in introspection through litigation if three
conditions were met.  First, the organization must have incentives to learn
about errors and weaknesses in its operations and improve its performance.
Second, those in positions of leadership must view lawsuits as a source of
valuable information about organizational performance.  And, third, the
organization must have the infrastructure and personnel in place to gather
and analyze information from lawsuits.  Hospitals generally meet each of
these conditions, as do the few law enforcement agencies that review lawsuits
for lessons.  Most other law enforcement agencies, it seems, do not have the
incentives, personnel, or favorable view of lawsuit data that would cause them
to review lawsuits for lessons.  After comparing the incentives and systems in
place in hospitals and police departments, this Part concludes with sugges-
tions about how to encourage introspection through litigation in law enforce-
ment agencies and other organizational settings.
A. Incentives for Introspection
Before engaging in introspection through litigation, an organization
must want to improve its performance.  An organization might want to
improve its performance for any number of reasons: to improve the quality of
the services it provides, reduce the costs or frequency of litigation, or
improve outsiders’ views of the organization.  Hospitals, generally speaking,
137 Id. at 1268–69 (describing the analysis and investigation of legal complaints).
138 See id. at 1260–70 (describing trend analysis).
139 See id. at 1270–72 (describing review of discovery while cases are pending).
140 See id. at 1272–75 (describing hospitals’ closed claims reviews).
141 Far more could be done to explore the differences and similarities of hospitals and
police departments.  Far more could be done to plumb the depths of the explanations that
I offer.  And far more could be done to explore the practices in those hospitals and police
departments that do not fall within these broad categories.  Further research should con-
sider all of these questions in greater depth.
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have financial and norms-based incentives to improve performance.  Police
departments, generally speaking, have neither.  The few law enforcement
agencies that do review lawsuits for lessons appear to have done so in
response to external pressures or mandates to improve.
1. Financial Incentives
Economic theories of deterrence predict that the threat of financial
sanctions will cause organizations to take steps that will reduce the likelihood
of future suits.142  Consistent with that prediction, organizations might
review lawsuits as a means of reducing the likelihood of future legal claims
and associated expenses.
Hospitals have multiple financial incentives to reduce the types of errors
that lead to malpractice suits.  A majority of hospitals self-insure their doctors
for medical malpractice claims, which should motivate them to reduce mal-
practice litigation costs whenever possible.143  Even insured hospitals benefit
financially when they reduce errors and suits, as hospitals’ medical malprac-
tice insurance premiums are generally tied to past litigation costs.144  Hospi-
tals also have financial incentives to reduce errors more generally.  For
example, Medicaid reimbursements are tied to whether hospitals track and
142 For foundational descriptions of this theory, see, for example, GUIDO CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987).  Although we expect that organizations will take
steps to reduce the likelihood of future harms, an organization might choose to reduce
litigation costs by engaging in harms that are less likely to result in civil liability.  For a
discussion of this possibility, see generally Margo Schlanger, Second Best Damage Action Deter-
rence, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 517 (2006).  Such organizations would still, presumably, review
information from lawsuits to determine which behaviors result in the greatest liability
exposure. See Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics, supra note 10, at 1037–40 (describing the
types of information and information systems organizations would need in order to make
informed decisions intended to reduce financial liability).
143 Annual reports by Aon Risk Solutions in conjunction with the American Society for
Healthcare Risk Management report that 74% of hospitals insure their providers through
self-insurance. See Joe Carlson, Systems Study Med-Mal Self-Insurance, MODERN HEALTHCARE
(Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20111025/NEWS/
310259966.  This is consistent with my survey of hospital risk managers and patient safety
personnel.  Of the 392 respondents who provided information about their hospitals’ insur-
ance status, 65% (294) reported that they were self-insured, 21% (83) reported they had
outside insurers, and 14% (55) reported “other,” which appeared in some instances to
include captive insurers.
144 See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1598 (2002) (explaining that experi-
ence rating can “create a financial incentive to improve quality and safety in order to
reduce the number of injuries”); see also Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability
Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1434–35 (2013)
(observing that individual doctors’ malpractice insurance is not generally experience
rated, but that “insurers use experience rating and consider loss prevention efforts when
selling professional liability insurance policies to larger group practices and hospitals”).
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analyze errors, and whether patients are readmitted as the result of errors.145
Hospitals must gather and analyze error data or lose accreditation and state
certification—either of which would have significant financial ramifica-
tions.146  Malpractice insurers may also provide financial incentives for hospi-
tals to reduce error rates.147
For-profit hospitals presumably have the strongest motivation to reduce
error and improve their performance, as improved care could lead to more
patients and increased profits.  There is some evidence to support this
hypothesis.  When I surveyed hospital risk managers and patient safety per-
sonnel, for-profit hospitals reported reviewing lawsuits for lessons with
slightly more frequency than nonprofit and government hospitals.148  But
almost all hospitals—regardless of their financial status—review lawsuits to
some degree, suggesting that hospitals’ profit status does not determine
whether hospitals gather and analyze lawsuits, but may influence how signifi-
cant a role lawsuits play in patient safety and performance improvement
efforts.
Law enforcement agencies have fewer financial incentives to reduce the
types of behaviors that lead to civil litigation.  Although governments—not
individual officers—pay approximately 99.98% of the dollars that plaintiffs
recover in police misconduct suits,149 law enforcement agencies bear limited
financial responsibility for those costs.  In many jurisdictions, the money to
satisfy settlements and judgments is paid out of general government funds,
145 See Robert Pear, Report Finds Most Errors at Hospitals Go Unreported, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/06/health/study-of-medicare-patients-finds-
most-hospital-errors-unreported.html?_r=0 (describing Medicaid requirements).
146 See Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: Toward a Federal Model of Medical Error
Reduction, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 18 (2005) (reporting that accreditation and government
reporting requirements “strive to create a state of ‘forced mindfulness’ by providers, as the
data allows for feedback as to sources of bad outcomes and the resulting ability to fix
problems”).  Note, however, that some commentators believe the Joint Commission—the
hospital accreditation body—is “notoriously gentle in its approach, slow to develop mean-
ingful standards and reluctant to develop enforcement mechanisms other than the
unlikely threat of withdrawal of accreditation.” Id. at 7.
147 For example, Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina advertises that it “provide[s]
financial incentives for hospitals to reduce their preventable infections and error rates.”
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF NORTH CAROLINA, http://connect.bcbsnc.com/lets-talk-
cost-2013/solutions/posts/solutions-rewarding-lower-error-rates/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2015).
148 Those responding to the survey were asked whether they “never,” “rarely,” “some-
times,” or “often” reviewed complaints, litigation discovery, claim trends, and closed claims
data.  To determine a hospital’s tendency to use litigation information for their patient
safety and improvement efforts, I assigned their responses to each question in a range from
a low of 1 (indicating that the litigation information was never used) to 4 (indicating that
the litigation information was often used).  Accordingly, a respondent who reported that
all four types of litigation data were often used would receive a 16; a respondent who
reported that all four types of litigation data were never used would receive a four.  The
101 respondents employed by for-profit hospitals had an average score of 14.30.  The 305
nonprofit and government hospitals had an average score of 12.89.
149 See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014)
(reporting study findings).
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not police department budgets.150  These departments have no financial
incentives to reduce suits.  Some law enforcement agencies do pay settle-
ments and judgments from their budgets, and some contribute to city- or
county-wide funds that pay these claims.151  But even when agencies bear
some financial responsibility for litigation payouts, the impact of this respon-
sibility on police operations may be limited; departments receive their budg-
ets from jurisdictions’ general funds, and jurisdictions may be wary to burden
departments’ budgets too significantly, as it might impair their ability to fight
crime.152
In addition, there are no financial pressures for police departments to
reduce errors more generally.  Law enforcement agencies receive money
from states and the federal government, but state and federal funding is not
tied in any way to the collection or assessment of data about police error.153
And while hospitals stand to lose patients and profits if they provide substan-
dard care, there is a far more tenuous relationship between police budgets
and police performance.  Police departments get their money from the gov-
ernment, not the individual civilians they are charged with protecting.  A per-
son dissatisfied with his police department can complain to government
officials but cannot take action that will have any direct financial effect on
that department.  Moreover, government officials may not view allegations of
police misconduct as a reason to reduce police department budgets.  Instead,
some believe that an increase in the number of lawsuits against a department
150 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNT-
ABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 80 (1998) (“[I]n most cities . . . civil settlements paid by the
city on behalf of an officer usually are not taken from the police budget but are paid from
general city funds.”); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case
of the Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 781–82 (2004) (“[T]he monetary cost of
judgments against police are not always fully or directly born by police departments or by
individual officers.  Civil judgments come out of city or county funds, or perhaps from
insurance policies that the local government purchases—i.e., from taxpayers.”); Schwartz,
Myths and Mechanics, supra note 10, at 1047–48 (describing New York City’s practice of
satisfying settlements and judgments out of the city’s general budget).
151 See, e.g., Email from Scott. M. Huizenga, Budget Officer, Budget Div., City of Kansas
City, Mo., to author (Sept. 8, 2014) (on file with author) (“[J]udgments and settlements
against KCPD [Kansas City Police Department] are paid from the KCPD budget.”); Email
from Michelle Allersma, San Francisco Controller’s Office Budget and Analysis Dir., to
author (Sept. 5, 2014) (on file with author) (“Each year, the Police Department’s General
Fund operating budget includes an amount to pay for claims.”).
152 In ongoing research, I am examining the ways in which jurisdictions across the
country pay for police misconduct litigation, and the ways in which these budgeting
arrangements influence lawsuits’ financial effects on law enforcement agencies. See gener-
ally Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
153 Federal funding is formally tied to prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of
race, color, national origin, sex, or religion, although this prohibition “is rarely used with
notable effect against police departments.”  Rachel Harmon, Limited Leverage: Federal Reme-
dies and Policing Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 53 (2012).  Moreover, there are no
“analogous statutes that condition federal funds for police departments on abstaining from
forms of misconduct other than discrimination.” Id. at 52.
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may result in a larger budget for the department because “the political
returns for higher police funding and appearing tough on crime may be
worth the budgetary cost.”154  In sum, it appears that most law enforcement
agencies appear to enjoy few if any financial gains when they reduce the fre-
quency of lawsuits, and face few if any financial sanctions when they fail to do
so.
2. Organizational Norms
Hospitals and police departments have different norms regarding the
importance of detecting, understanding, and reducing the types of errors
that lead to litigation.  This difference in perspective likely influences the
frequency with which each type of organization reviews lawsuits for
lessons.155
Thirty years ago, malpractice was generally considered rare and the
result of errors by individual medical providers, and limited information was
gathered and analyzed about medical errors.  In its watershed report, To Err
Is Human, published in 1999, the Institute of Medicine argued that medical
error was far more frequent than the public had previously believed; that
medical error was caused primarily by system-wide weaknesses in policy,
organization, equipment, and technology; and that gathering and analyzing
information about error was key to addressing these systemic weaknesses.156
Although patient safety advocates had made these arguments long before the
Institute of Medicine’s report, To Err Is Human has been credited with shift-
ing the perspectives of the public and policymakers about the frequency of
medical error, the causes of medical error, and the importance of gathering
and analyzing data about error.157
154 Miller & Wright, supra note 150, at 772; see also PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERN-
MENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 125 (1983) (“The political environment
may countenance or even reward lawbreaking that appears to advance important program-
matic or ideological goals such as crime control, intelligence-gathering, or preservation of
neighborhood schools.”).
155 A larger discussion could be had comparing and contrasting police department and
hospital cultures.  For work discussing the culture of medicine, see, for example, David A.
Hyman & Charles Silver, Healthcare Quality, Patient Safety, and the Culture of Medicine: “Denial
Ain’t Just a River in Egypt,” 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417, 421–28 (2012).  For work discussing
the culture of police departments, see, for example, Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational
Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 495 (2004).  For work on organi-
zational culture and norms more generally, see, for example, JOHN P. KOTTER & JAMES L.
HESKETT, CORPORATE CULTURE AND PERFORMANCE (1992); EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZA-
TIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP (4th ed. 2010); Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice, Situated
Action, and the Social Control of Organizations, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 23 (1998).
156 See Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1232–34 (describing the Institute of
Medicine’s report).
157 See generally Lucian L. Leape & Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After To Err Is Human:
What Have We Learned?, 293 JAMA 2384 (2005) (describing the effects of To Err Is Human
on perceptions and policies regarding medical error).
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In the years following the Institute of Medicine’s report, hospitals have
significantly increased the extent to which they gather and analyze data
about their performance.158  State and federal regulations and the Joint
Commission, hospitals’ accreditation body, have mandated increased data
collection; hospitals have also developed patient safety programs on their
own initiative.159  Hospitals have hired patient safety personnel charged with
implementing their patient safety and healthcare quality responsibilities,160
and hospitals’ risk management staff report that they have embraced patient
safety as a goal of their work.161
The shifting perspective about the frequency of medical error and the
importance of collecting and assessing information about errors when they
occur appears to have encouraged the assessment of information in lawsuits.
Patient safety advocates believe that key to reducing error is being transpar-
ent with patients and “sharing information about injuries with systems that
facilitate analysis and learning.”162  Although hospital risk managers histori-
cally discouraged the discussion of errors in an effort to reduce malpractice
liability, my research suggests that the culture of openness and transparency
encouraged by patient safety advocates appears to be influencing hospital
risk managers’ response to litigation risk.163  Risk managers are increasingly
encouraging medical providers to be transparent with patients when errors
occur, and are encouraging and participating in internal discussion about
errors—including discussions about lawsuits and the information learned
from pending and closed cases.164
Although I contend that norms have shifted regarding the importance
of detecting and reporting medical errors, I do not mean to suggest that
medical providers’ conduct is always consistent with these norms.  One study
found that 96% of doctors surveyed believed they should report impaired or
incompetent colleagues, but 45% had failed to do so.165  A study of risk man-
158 See Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1232–37 (describing patient safety
efforts implemented in recent years).
159 See id. at 1235–36 (describing increased data collection in hospitals after the Insti-
tute of Medicine’s report).
160 See id. at 1236–37 (describing risk management and patient safety personnel
charged with implementing patient safety requirements and goals).
161 See infra Section II.C (describing the views of risk managers and patient safety
personnel).
162 Michelle M. Mello et al., “Health Courts” and Accountability for Patient Safety, 84
MILBANK Q. 459, 472 (2006).
163 See Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1294–95 (describing the findings of
the study).
164 See id. at 1254–55 (describing risk managers’ efforts to encourage providers to be
transparent with patients); id. at 1260–63 (describing increasing discussions between risk
managers, patient safety personnel, and medical providers about medical error).
165 See Eric G. Campbell et al., Professionalism in Medicine: Results of a National Survey of
Physicians, 147 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 795 (2007).  This phenomenon is what some have
called a “conspiracy of silence.” See, e.g., Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice,
97 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1212 (2012).  Notably, commentators have used this same phrase—
“conspiracy of silence”—to describe police officers’ disinclination to report misconduct by
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agers reported similar findings; although the majority of risk managers sur-
veyed asserted that it was their hospital’s practice “always” to disclose errors
to patients or their families, hospital records indicated patients were not
always informed of errors.166  Doctors, risk managers, and other personnel
do not always practice what they preach.  But norms—and at least some
behaviors—regarding the importance of detecting and reporting error have
shifted over the past few decades.
The world of policing looks much like the world of medicine did in the
years before the Institute of Medicine’s report.  Instead of recognizing police
error as a significant and systemic concern, law enforcement officials often
dismiss allegations of police misconduct, or acknowledge wrongdoing but
place the blame on “bad apple” officers.167  In contrast to hospitals’ focus on
systems-level weaknesses that lead to error, less attention is paid in law
enforcement to system-wide weaknesses in policy, organization, equipment,
and technology.168  In contrast to the culture of transparency promoted by
patient safety advocates, police officers and police department leadership are
believed to follow a “code of silence” that values “silence and loyalty” to fel-
low officers over the disclosure of misconduct or corruption.169
There are ongoing efforts to shift norms about police error and the cul-
ture of policing more generally.  Advocates have long argued, based on avail-
able data, that police misconduct is widespread;170 scholars have long called
for better collection and assessment of data about police behavior so that
policymakers can understand the extent of police misconduct;171 and a grow-
their peers. See, e.g., Howard B. Klein, Fighting Corruption in the Philadelphia Police Depart-
ment: The Death Knell of the “Conspiracy of Silence,” 60 TEMPLE L.Q. 103 (1987).
166 See Rae M. Lamb et al., Hospital Disclosure Practices: Results of a National Survey, 22
HEALTH AFF. 73, 75, 79 (2003).
167 Armacost, supra note 155, at 455 (arguing that “[t]he primary defect in these expla-
nations” offered for police violence “is that they view police misconduct as resulting from
factual and moral judgments made by officers functioning as individuals, rather than as
part of a distinctive and influential organizational culture”); Gilles, supra note 82, at 31
(“Municipalities generally write off the misconduct of an individual officer to the ‘bad
apple theory,’ under which municipal governments or their agencies attribute misconduct
to aberrant behavior by a single ‘bad apple,’ thereby deflecting attention from systemic
and institutional factors contributing to recurring constitutional deprivations.”).
168 For some exceptions to this rule, see infra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
169 JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE
OF FORCE 111–12 (1993); see also Gilles, supra note 82, at 63–64 (observing that the police
“code of silence”—meaning “the refusal of a police officer to ‘rat’ on fellow officers, even if
the officer has knowledge of wrongdoing or misconduct”—“has existed, to varying degrees,
for as long as there have been organized police forces”).
170 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 150 (describing police misconduct
across the United States).
171 Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119,
1133–45 (2013) (describing limited state and federal data collection requirements for law
enforcement agencies and institutional constraints on more robust data collection); Mat-
thew J. Hickman, Alex R. Piquero & Joel H. Garner, Toward a National Estimate of Police Use
of Nonlethal Force, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 563, 565 (2008) (“[L]ocal, state, and federal
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ing number of cities have appointed police auditors, civilian complaint
review boards, police advisory commissions, and other civilian-run entities
charged with improving police accountability.172  Within police department
ranks, tides appear to be shifting to some degree as well: departments are
finding ways to engage cooperatively with the communities they patrol and
the increasing diversification of police forces has “decreas[ed] the insularity
of police forces as well as their monolithic solidarity.”173  Over the past
twenty-five years, departments have increasingly adopted early intervention
systems to track problem officers and other reforms to increase professional-
ism and accountability.174  Some departments are also apologizing for errors
when they occur175—an approach that has reduced the incidence and costs
of medical malpractice litigation.176
Those with an interest in improving policing also appear increasingly to
be examining system-level weaknesses that lead to error.  For example, the
Force Science Institute has been applying human factors research, common
in aviation and medicine, to law enforcement.177  The Department of Justice
has, in recent years, focused attention on systems-level weaknesses that may
lead to error, including the lack of assistance for officers suffering from
stress, the effects of off-duty assignments on officer fatigue, and the need for
training about interactions with mentally ill arrestees.178  And the National
Institute of Justice recently issued a report reminiscent of To Err Is Human,
calling on law enforcement to follow the model adopted by medicine (and
governments actually collect and report very little information about police use of force,
much less than about police behavior in general.”).
172 The National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE)
works to bring these organizations and entities together to improve police accountability
practices.  For a list of police departments with some form of civilian oversight, see U.S.
Oversight Agency Websites, NAT’L ASS’N FOR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENF’T, http://nacole
.org/resources/u-s-oversight-agency-websites/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2015).
173 David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 578
(2008); see also id. at 575 (describing the rise of community policing, and describing activi-
ties that fall under that rubric).
174 See generally EPP, supra note 23 (describing the growth of what Epp calls “legalized
accountability” in policing and other areas).
175 See, e.g., Alphonse Gerhardstein & David Krings, Uncomfortably True Police Misconduct
Cases: Keys to Appropriate Methods of Resolution, 94 PUB. MGMT. 10, 11 (2012), available at
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/policing-litigation-confer
ence/files/Professional%20Manager%20magazine%20-%20settling%20police%20miscon
duct.pdf (describing mediation and apology efforts in Lockland, Ohio following two police
incidents, and concluding that “[a] sincere effort by a local government manager to make
amends for a public safety situation that went horribly wrong can lead to a far better emo-
tional and financial outcome for all parties involved”).
176 See Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1256–58 (describing the effective-
ness of hospital disclosure and apology programs at reducing medical malpractice claims
and costs).
177 Studies can be viewed at FORCE SCI. INST. LTD., http://www.forcescience.org (last
visited Jan. 1, 2015).
178 See generally NEW ORLEANS, supra note 33 (describing these and other recommenda-
tions to improve the department).
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aviation before it) and analyze law enforcement errors and “near misses” to
identify systemic weaknesses.179  These developments may mark the begin-
ning of a shift in law enforcement norms.  But, as of now, despite these pock-
ets of reform, there has been no seismic shift in the way in which law
enforcement views the importance of detecting, understanding, and reduc-
ing error.180
It may, in fact, be more difficult to shift law enforcement responses to
information about error than it has been to shift norms in medicine.  Doc-
tors and hospitals strive to make their patients healthy;181 collecting and ana-
lyzing information about medical error is consistent with this goal.  To be
sure, doctors historically resisted collecting data about error, but they are
hypothesized to have done so because they “view an error as a failure of char-
acter” and, therefore, feel “a strong pressure to intellectual dishonesty, to
cover up mistakes rather than to admit them.”182  In other words, doctors are
so committed to doing no harm that they may not admit harms when they
occur.
Although doctors’ and hospitals’ interests in improving patients’ health
are consistent with the collection and assessment of data about medical
error, police departments’ and officers’ efforts to reduce crime and maintain
order may be seen to conflict with the collection and assessment of informa-
tion about police error.183  Police department officials may believe that some
constitutional violations are a necessary by-product of aggressive policing,
and aggressive policing is necessary to deter future crime and secure
179 See James M. Doyle, The Paradigm Shift in Criminal Justice, THE CRIME REPORT (Mar. 4,
2014, 10:55 AM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/viewpoints/2014-03-the-paradigm-shift-
in-criminal-justice (calling on law enforcement to “adapt the core insights of safety reform-
ers in aviation, medicine and other fields to criminal justice”). See generally NAT’L INST. OF
JUSTICE, MENDING JUSTICE: SENTINEL EVENTS REVIEWS (2014), available at https://ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/247141.pdf.
180 See Samuel Walker, Institutionalizing Police Accountability Reforms: The Problem of Mak-
ing Police Reforms Endure, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 57, 71 (2012) (observing, despite
some organizational shifts, “the difficulty of getting the rank and file to support innova-
tion—accountability-related reforms in particular”).
181 See Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1851 (1994) (“For years,
medical and nursing students have been taught Florence Nightengale’s dictum—first, do
no harm . . . . Physicians are socialized in medical school and residency to strive for error-
free practice.  There is a powerful emphasis on perfection, both in diagnosis and treat-
ment.  In everyday hospital practice, the message is equally clear: mistakes are unaccept-
able.” (footnote omitted)).
182 Id. at 1851–52.
183 See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal
Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 54 (2014) (illustrating Philip Selznick’s “precarious val-
ues”—in which doing “‘the right thing’ means executing not only a primary mission but
also constraints on that mission”—by describing the police: “[W]e want police to prevent
and respond to crime and maintain order, but to do so without infringing anyone’s civil
rights”).
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order.184  Officials who hold such beliefs will also likely believe that gathering
and analyzing information about claims of police misconduct—and changing
policies and practices as a result—will undermine effective policing.  At the
very least, gathering and analyzing data about police misconduct will take
time and money away from other crime control efforts.185  To the extent that
law enforcement officials consider officers’ crime control efforts to be com-
promised by efforts to respect civilians’ constitutional rights, officials will
have little incentive to gather and analyze information about police error
from lawsuits and other sources.
3. External Pressures
Although hospitals typically have financial and norms-based incentives to
improve their performance, not all hospitals are adequately motivated by
these incentives to improve.  At least some hospitals have endeavored to
improve the medical care they provide only after negative press coverage,
government investigations, and other external pressures.186
The few police departments that do gather and analyze lawsuits and
other data about police performance appear to have been pressured to do so
through the legal or political process.  The Department of Justice has recom-
mended or required most of the law enforcement agencies it has investigated
to gather and analyze lawsuits for performance lessons.187  For those jurisdic-
tions under court supervision, monitors have worked to ensure that informa-
tion from lawsuits and other sources is actually collected and analyzed.188
Other jurisdictions began reviewing lawsuits as a response to political
pressures.  For example, Los Angeles County appointed an independent
commission to evaluate the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department after a series of
184 See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 155, at 475 (observing that police departments may
accept police misconduct lawsuits as the costs of aggressive policing).
185 Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) (“Police departments do not exist to promote civil rights.  Instead, they
exist to prevent crime, protect life, enforce law, and maintain order.  Promoting civil rights
can sometimes interfere with these primary objectives because assessing misconduct and
identifying, implementing, and monitoring appropriate reforms is difficult and consumes
resources.”).
186 The press coverage and congressional investigations of VA hospitals, for example,
have caused the VA to address shortcomings in its services.  For descriptions of the govern-
ment investigations, and an example of the press coverage, see, for example, Curt Devine,
Bad VA Care May Have Killed More than 1,000 Veterans, Senator’s Report Says, CNN (June 24,
2014, 5:35 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/24/us/senator-va-report/.  For a descrip-
tion of the changes announced by the VA, see Kimberly Leonard, Massive VA Health Over-
haul Announced, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP’T (Nov. 10, 2014, 3:51 PM), http://www.usnews
.com/news/articles/2014/11/10/robert-mcdonald-announces-massive-va-health-overhaul.
187 See Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics, supra note 10, at 1052–57 (describing the types of
policies recommended in Department of Justice technical assistance letters and required
in Department of Justice consent decrees).
188 See id. at 1084 (describing the importance of court monitors and external auditors
in police departments’ efforts to implement policy changes).
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high-profile shootings, a series of articles in the Los Angeles Times, and a series
of large settlements and judgments against the Department.189  It was that
commission that recommended the appointment of outside observers who
decided, as part of their oversight, to analyze lawsuits as one means of risk
management.190  High-publicity incidents involving police officers were also
the apparent cause for other departments’ decisions to hire auditors who
evaluate performance by reviewing information from lawsuits and other
sources.191
B. Belief in Lawsuits’ Informational Value
Even if an organization is incentivized to improve behavior, it will not
engage in introspection through litigation unless organizational leaders
believe that lawsuits would offer useful lessons.  Although outside researchers
have convincingly shown that medical malpractice lawsuits are a source of
valuable information about medical error, no comparable research about
police lawsuits exists.
In 1983, long before the Institute of Medicine’s report, the president of
the American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) began a study of closed mal-
practice cases as a way of identifying the causes of anesthesiology injury.192
The ASA recruited thirty-five insurance companies to make their claims files
available; volunteer anesthesiologists coded the files and investigators
reviewed the claims for consistency before submitting them to the
database.193  Analysis of the closed claims revealed previously unknown
causes of injury in anesthesiology patients.194  Ten years after the ASA study
began, anesthesiology error had dropped precipitously, and the ASA Closed
Claims Study was credited with improving the safety of the practice.
Researchers, citing the ASA’s success, have used closed claims to identify
189 See KOLTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 1 (observing that the appointment of a commis-
sion to review the Department was the result of “[a]n increase over the past years in the
number of officer-involved shootings,” “[f]our controversial shootings of minorities by
LASD deputies in August 1991,” and the fact that “Los Angeles County . . . paid $32 million
in claims arising from the operations of the LASD over the last four years”).
190 See Schwartz, What Police Learn, supra note 10, at 849–50 (describing the commis-
sion’s report and recommendations, including the appointment of special counsel to
report to the County about the Department).
191 See id. at 850–52 (describing high-profile incidents in Seattle and Chicago that
caused each city to appoint civilians to oversee aspects of their departments and who began
to review litigation data as part of that oversight).
192 See Frederick W. Cheney, The American Society of Anesthesiologists Closed Claims Project:
What Have We Learned, How Has It Affected Practice, and How Will It Affect Practice in the
Future?, 91 ANESTHESIOLOGY 552 (1999), available at http://journals.lww.com/anesthesiol
ogy/Citation/1999/08000/The_American_Society_of_Anesthesiologists_Closed.30.aspx
(describing the impetus for the ASA Closed Claims Project).
193 See id. at 553.
194 Id. at 554.
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causes of error in other practice areas.195  Even in the early days of the
patient safety movement, researchers recognized that—although lawsuits
were poor indicators of the frequency of error and lawsuit outcomes were
poor indicators of the extent of a defendant’s wrongdoing—medical mal-
practice claims “may hold lessons the medical profession ought to learn.”196
Accordingly, the groundwork was laid for malpractice lawsuits to play a role
in hospital patient safety efforts.
Lawsuits have played a less significant role in scholarly work examining
the causes of police misconduct.  Although scholars have studied section
1983 cases as a way of understanding how many cases are filed and their rate
of success,197 scholars have largely overlooked closed section 1983 cases as a
way of identifying trends in policies and practices that lead to misconduct
allegations.  Perhaps insurance providers have been less willing to share
closed claims data with researchers.198  Or, perhaps, those who study the
police have not considered lawsuits a valuable source of information about
the nature and causes of misconduct.
Although many law enforcement officials are skeptical of lawsuits as a
source of useful information,199 this view may slowly be shifting.  The value of
lawsuits as a means of understanding and improving police practices has
been advocated by a small number of people, and illustrated in a small but
growing number of departments.  Merrick Bobb, who served as special coun-
sel for the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, and was charged with
reviewing the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, was among the first and
195 See, e.g., M. Ennis & C.A. Vincent, Obstetric Accidents: A Review of 64 Cases, 300 BRIT.
MED. J. 1365 (1990) (using closed claims to study obstetric errors); Allen Kachalia et al.,
Missed and Delayed Diagnoses in the Emergency Department: A Study of Closed Malpractice Claims
from 4 Liability Insurers, 49 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 196 (2007) (using closed claims to
study emergency room errors); Selwyn O. Rogers, Jr. et al., Analysis of Surgical Errors in
Closed Malpractice Claims at 4 Liability Insurers, 140 SURGERY 25 (2006) (using closed claims
to study surgical errors).
196 Richard L. Kravitz et al., Malpractice Claims Data as a Quality Improvement Tool, 266
JAMA 2087, 2087–88 (1991).
197 See, e.g., David K. Chiabi, Police Civil Liability: An Analysis of Section 1983 Actions in the
Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, 21 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 83 (1996); Theodore Eisen-
berg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482
(1982); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 641 (1987); Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Con-
stitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defen-
dant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 728–30 (1988).
198 See Candace McCoy, How Civil Rights Lawsuits Improve American Policing, in HOLDING
POLICE ACCOUNTABLE 111, 119, 151 n.13 (Candace McCoy ed., 2010) (observing that
“insurance company records [as they relate to police misconduct suits] are private and
seldom released to researchers” with the exception of “one small database from an insur-
ance source, covering the years 1974 to 1984” that was released to McCoy only because the
company “is now defunct”).
199 See Schwartz, What Police Learn, supra note 10, at 874 n.184 (describing officials’
criticisms of police misconduct lawsuits as a source of information).
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most vocal advocates for lawsuits as a source of valuable information.200  The
Office of Independent Review (OIR), another oversight agency for the Los
Angeles Sheriff’s Department, also began reviewing lawsuits when it was
formed in 2001.201  A former staff attorney for OIR then served as the civilian
auditor of the Chicago Police Department, and incorporated review of law-
suits into her analysis.202  Richard Rosenthal, the police auditor who caused
the Portland Police Department to begin looking at lawsuits in 2004, then
became the police auditor in Denver and imported his litigation review prac-
tices to that jurisdiction.203
In July 2014, inspired by the effective uses of lawsuit data in Seattle, Port-
land, and the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, the New York City Comp-
troller, Scott M. Stringer, introduced ClaimStat, a program to track and
analyze lawsuit claims against the New York City Police Department and
other city agencies.204  New York City’s CompStat system has been at the fore-
front of data collection efforts to reduce crime in law enforcement agencies
across the country.205  Time will tell whether New York City’s ClaimStat
approach is adopted by other jurisdictions with the same enthusiasm.
C. Personnel
Even if an organization wants to improve its performance, and its leader-
ship believes that reviewing lawsuits is one way to do so, an organization will
not engage in introspection through litigation unless the professional per-
sonnel who would be directly responsible for analyzing lawsuits for lessons
are willing to do so.206  Hospital risk managers and defense counsel appear
to have increasingly accepted the importance of gathering and analyzing
200 See id. at 872–73.
201 See id. at 848 n.34.
202 See id. at 852.
203 See id. at 851–52.
204 See OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. CONTROLLER, CLAIMSTAT: PROTECTING CITIZENS AND SAVING
TAXPAYER DOLLARS 14 (2014), available at http://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2014/07/ClaimStat.pdf (describing the program and citing examples from Seat-
tle, Portland, and Los Angeles County, drawn from What Police Learn, of the benefits of
reviewing lawsuits for lessons).
205 See Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics, supra note 10, at 1071–72 (describing CompStat
and its adoption in police departments around the country and around the world).
206 Organizational sociologists have long recognized that professional personnel can
shape the practices and norms in their organizations. See Schlanger, supra note 2, at
14–16; see also Schlanger, supra note 183 (describing what Schlanger calls “offices of good-
ness,” offices within larger agencies charged with furthering some extrinsic mission, and
possible factors leading to the success of such agencies).  In the workplace, for example,
professional personnel have translated broad prohibitions of discrimination into policies
and practices and thereby are responsible for putting the law into action. See generally
FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2009); Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity
Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1591 (2001); Lauren B.
Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace,
27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497, 497–98 (1993); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Dis-
crimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 462 (2001).
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information about error, including information from lawsuits.  Police depart-
ments, in contrast, generally do not have risk managers, and available evi-
dence indicates that defense attorneys representing police officers are
reluctant to share information from lawsuits with police leadership.
1. Risk Managers
Since the malpractice crisis in the 1970s, hospitals have had risk manag-
ers focused on reducing litigation risk.  After To Err Is Human was published
in 1999,207 hospitals began hiring patient safety and quality personnel
focused on reducing error in hospitals.208  Although risk managers and
patient safety advocates originally worked separately, they have become more
connected in recent years.209  Risk managers have increasingly seen improv-
ing patient safety as a key aspect of their work.210  Risk managers and quality
improvement personnel report working closely together to identify litigation
and safety risks and design interventions.  And risk managers report tracking
and analyzing claims, keeping abreast of discovery uncovered during litiga-
tion, and reviewing closed claims as means of reducing risk and improving
safety.
Police departments, in contrast, rarely have personnel dedicated to
understanding and reducing error in policing.  Government, insurance, and
law enforcement organizations have long encouraged police risk manage-
ment as a means of addressing police risk and reducing litigation costs.211
Yet, in 2004, when Carol Archbold surveyed 354 law enforcement agencies
with over 200 employees, she found that just 14 of the agencies—fewer than
4%—had risk managers in their departments to address liability issues.212
When police departments implement systems to gather and analyze data, it is
often police sergeants and other supervisors who are charged with these
responsibilities.213  Yet computerized data entry and analysis are skills that
“often ‘lie outside the traditional roles for which they were selected and
207 INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN (1999).
208 See Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1226–27.
209 See id. at 1261–62.
210 See id. at 1253–54.
211 See WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note 135, at 218–20 (observing that “several profes-
sional groups and publications have identified the need for the use of risk management in
police organizations” including the Public Risk Management Association, the Commission
on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Intergovernmental Risk Manage-
ment Agency); Carol A. Archbold, Managing the Bottom Line: Risk Management in Policing, 28
POLICING 30, 34–36 (2005) (describing various publications promoting law enforcement
risk management).
212 Archbold, supra note 211, at 38 (describing study findings); see also CAROL A.
ARCHBOLD, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND LEGAL ADVISING 38–39 (2004)
(describing the same study).
213 See Walker, supra note 180, at 76 (observing that early intervention systems are “an
entirely new way of conducting police supervision” that involve “changes in the traditional
work habits of police sergeants”).
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trained’ and in which they have much experience.”214  Moreover, police line
and command staff may not have the time215 or motivation216 to make sure
that these new tasks are done correctly—much less to innovate and improve.
Departments are also relatively rarely overseen or guided by city officials
or other outsiders.  Charles Epp surveyed practices in over 800 police depart-
ments across the country and found that, in almost 60% of departments,
command-level officers never or almost never communicate with city attor-
neys or city-wide risk managers about officer use-of-force issues.217  Approxi-
mately 115 departments across the country218 have independent auditors
who oversee police departments in some manner—a model that police
accountability expert Samuel Walker has described as the best way to ensure
lasting police reform.219  And at least some of these auditors—including
those in each of the five litigation-attentive police departments I studied—
gather and analyze information about police performance from lawsuits and
other sources.  But the vast majority of the over 18,000 law enforcement
agencies across the country have no outside reviewers to assist with accounta-
bility efforts.220
Hospital risk managers and patient safety personnel have been critically
important to the translation of patient safety goals into policies and proce-
dures that reduce error.  Without comparable personnel in most law enforce-
ment agencies and limited oversight by outsiders, it should come as no
surprise that police departments less frequently review lawsuits for lessons.
214 Id. at 71 (quoting Skogan, supra note 15, at 26).
215 See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS OF LOCAL POLICE:
LESSONS LEARNED 20 (2013) (describing time constraints on sergeants and advising that
police executives should not “burden sergeants with excess paperwork if you want them to
supervise officers on the streets”).
216 See supra subsection II.A.2 (describing organizational norms that can limit intro-
spection); see also supra Section I.B (describing some reasons that supervisors may be disin-
clined to investigate line officers’ misconduct).
217 Epp asked: “How frequently do command-level officers in your department consult
about issues related to the use of force with your city’s risk management officials or legal
staff other than prosecutors?” and 4.7% responded “daily or weekly”; 7.7% responded
“monthly”; 28.6% responded “several times a year”; 41.2% responded “[a] few times over
several years”; and 17.2% responded “never or almost never.” EPP, supra note 23, at 254.
218 The website of the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement
lists 115 American cities and counties with civilian oversight. See U.S. Oversight Agency Web-
sites, supra note 172; cf. LaDoris Cordell, Policing the CHP: Beating Shows Officers Need Indepen-
dent Oversight, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (July 9, 2014), http://www.mercurynews.com/
opinion/ci_26105353/policing-chp-beating-shows-officers-need-independent-oversight
(reporting that “200 cities and counties across this nation have oversight agencies”).
219 See Walker, supra note 180, at 84–85.
220 See Schwartz, What Police Learn, supra note 10, at 887 (describing the role of auditors
in identifying and addressing implementation problems).
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2. Defense Counsel
Introspection through litigation is near impossible without the coopera-
tion of defense counsel.  Assuming the organization is named as a defendant,
it should have access to the complaint.  But organizational leadership will not
have access to the details unearthed during discovery, the evidence mar-
shaled in expert reports and briefs, or the closed case file unless defense
counsel shares this information.
Hospitals that engage in introspection through litigation report getting
information about suits from their attorneys.221  Hospital risk managers
describe regular communications with defense counsel about lawsuits as they
progress; defense lawyers may share depositions and other documents with
the risk manager or provide regular reports about the status of discovery.222
In some hospitals, defense counsel periodically present information about
open cases to larger groups including risk management, medical staff, and
patient safety personnel.223  Although these meetings are intended to help
defense counsel assess the merits of the case, information learned by hospital
staff during these meetings is also used to further patient safety objectives.224
In contrast, those few police departments that do seek to gather and
analyze litigation information have reported significant opposition by
defense counsel.  The Kolts Commission, which evaluated the Los Angeles
Sheriff’s Department in 1992, observed that defense lawyers learned valuable
information during litigation but that information “did not make its way sys-
tematically to the Department and was not used for risk management pur-
poses.”225  Ten years later, the Los Angeles County OIR, charged with
overseeing the Department’s investigations, reported that the Office of Los
Angeles County Counsel had refused to share litigation information with the
oversight agency.226  Although the OIR received information about lawsuit
complaints from the Department, “County Counsel . . . blocked OIR from
acquiring any further documents or information generated by the civil litiga-
tion process.”227
Police auditors have faced similar roadblocks to information sharing in
other jurisdictions.  After Richard Rosenthal, the former police auditor in
Portland, was given authorization to investigate claims made in lawsuits, the
city attorney refused to turn over the notices of claim he needed to start his
221 See Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1270–71.
222 See id.
223 See id. at 1271 (describing these meetings).
224 See id.
225 L.A. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, FIFTEENTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT 83–84 (2002).
226 See OFFICE OF INDEP. REVIEW, CNTY. OF L.A., FIRST REPORT 55 (2002), available at
http://shq.lasdnews.net/shq/LASD_Oversight/report1.pdf.
227 Id. Note, however, that in subsequent years, the relationship between OIR and the
Office of Los Angeles County Counsel improved: it began sharing litigation materials and
allowed OIR to participate in discussions of pending litigation. See MICHAEL Gennaco et
al., Office of Indep. Review, Cnty. of L.A., Second Annual Report 79 (2003).
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investigations.228  After three years of struggling with the city attorney’s office
for these claims, he found another city agency that would provide him with
the claims.229  When Rosenthal became the auditor in Denver, the city attor-
ney again did not provide him with copies of the lawsuits filed against the
department and its officers.230  He only began receiving copies of the suits
after a new deputy was hired as chief of litigation who agreed to cooperate
with Rosenthal.231
Although more study is necessary to understand why malpractice
defense counsel are more willing than city counsel representing the police to
share information about errors, the remainder of this Section suggests two
possible causes for this phenomenon.  First, defense counsel may share litiga-
tion information more often with hospital administrators because hospitals
have a more direct financial stake in the outcome of malpractice suits.  For
the hospitals that are self-insured, defense counsel share information about
pending suits with hospital personnel while seeking guidance about what
course of action to take—whether to settle (and if so, for how much) or
whether to take a case to trial.232  Hospitals with outside insurers also consult
with hospital executives about litigation strategy.233  Police departments, as
previously described, often do not pay litigation costs out of their budgets.
Moreover, it tends to be the city or county attorney, city council, or police
commissioner who decides whether to indemnify an officer in a lawsuit, and
the city or county council, treasurer, or comptroller who decides whether to
approve a settlement.234  If a police department does not control its litigation
costs, defense counsel has less reason to inform police executives about the
details of ongoing litigation or seek their guidance about what course to take.
Second, defense counsel in malpractice cases may share more litigation
information with hospital administrators because there are greater eviden-
tiary protections for internal discussions of medical error.  Hospital and
police department personnel both report fearing that internal analysis of
errors might be discoverable in litigation.  For this reason, police depart-
ments may suspend internal investigations once lawsuits are filed.  Even when
228 See Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics, supra note 10, at 1065–66 (observing that in
2008, the Portland police auditor “had the authority to investigate claims made in lawsuits
for three years, but the city attorney’s office continue[d] to refuse to provide him with the
notices of claim he need[ed] to begin the investigations”).
229 See Telephone Interview with Richard Rosenthal (June 9, 2011).
230 See id.
231 See id.
232 See Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1271 (describing periodic meetings
with defense counsel and a hospital committee including risk managers, medical staff, and
executives, during which defense counsel would describe the strengths and weaknesses of
cases and the committee would decide whether to settle the case).
233 See id. at 1271 n.234 (describing similar meetings with hospital personnel led by the
insurer instead of by defense counsel).
234 See Schwartz, supra note 149, at 904 (describing review of city and county council
minutes in which settlements and judgments were approved); id. at 907 (describing who
makes indemnification decisions).
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cities require that lawsuit allegations be internally investigated, city attorneys
have refused to turn over the complaints, citing the fear that an internal
investigation will harm the defense of the case.235  Hospital personnel share
the concern that internal discussions might be discoverable; as a result, hos-
pital risk managers report tailoring internal communications so that they fall
within the confines of available evidentiary privileges.236
Although police and hospital personnel share concerns about disclo-
sure, existing law protects internal communications in hospitals far more
than in police departments.  Every state protects information from peer
reviews of medical errors, most states protect the information in morbidity
and mortality conferences, and at least twenty-one states protect information
from internal error reports.237  If a hospital is designated as a patient safety
organization, it can collect and analyze error information from multiple hos-
pitals without that information being subject to disclosure during litiga-
tion.238  With such protections, defense counsel, risk management, and
medical providers can discuss the details of pending litigation with the assur-
ance that all discussions will be protected from discovery.
Law enforcement agencies’ internal discussions have significantly less
protection from discovery.  Twenty-one states provide that internal affairs
documents and civilian complaints are public record.239  In the other states,
defense counsel in police misconduct litigation can argue that several privi-
leges shield internal affairs reports and other internal documents from dis-
closure.240  Yet, despite defendants’ assertions of privilege, internal affairs
investigations are routinely produced during discovery.241  Attorneys defend-
235 The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department’s special counsel has repeatedly despaired
that attorneys for the Department do not share damaging information in suits with the
Department. See Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics, supra note 10, at 1065–66; see also supra
notes 228–31 and accompanying text (describing city attorneys’ refusals to share informa-
tion with police auditors in Portland and Denver).
236 Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1264–66.
237 See id. at 1264.
238 See id. at 1264–66.
239 See Jenny Rachel Macht, Should Police Misconduct Files Be Public Record? Why Internal
Affairs Investigations and Citizen Complaints Should Be Open to Public Scrutiny, 45 CRIM. L. BULL.
1006 (2009).
240 Privileges invoked by defense counsel in police misconduct litigation include the
self-critical analysis privilege, the executive privilege, and the deliberative process privilege.
 See Josh Jones, Behind the Shield? Law Enforcement Agencies and the Self-Critical Analysis Privi-
lege, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609, 1612–13 (2003).
241 See, e.g., Carillo v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, No. 2:10-cv-02122-KJD-GWF, 2013
WL 592893, at *6 (D. Nev. Feb. 14, 2013) (holding that internal investigation files were
discoverable in plaintiff’s section 1983 suit against the police department, and citing sev-
eral cases that found internal affairs reports are not entitled to high levels of protection
from discovery); Groark v. Timek, 989 F. Supp. 2d 378, 400 (D.N.J. 2013) (ordering the
production of all internal affairs investigations involving defendant officers in a section
1983 suit); Estate of Bui v. City of Westminster Police Dep’t, 244 F.R.D. 591, 597 (C.D. Cal.
2007) (ordering production of the internal affairs investigation of the incident that was the
basis for the section 1983 suit).
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ing police officers in lawsuits have refused to share information about pend-
ing litigation with police officers in apparent fear that disclosures may be
discoverable.242  For this reason, perhaps, even the litigation-attentive police
departments in my study did not analyze discovery and expert reports while
litigation was pending; instead, police auditors reviewed case files after the
cases were concluded.
D. Encouraging Introspection
I have shown that lawsuits can reveal useful, previously unknown infor-
mation that has fallen through the cracks of organizations’ other information
systems.  I have also shown that some organizations—including police depart-
ments—infrequently review information from lawsuits in an effort to improve
their performance.  Based on a comparison of police department and hospi-
tal practices, it seems that organizations are more likely to engage in intro-
spection through litigation if they have incentives to do so, a positive view of
the value of lawsuit information to performance improvement efforts, and
the personnel in place to analyze lawsuits for lessons.
Given the benefits of lawsuit data to organizational improvement efforts,
outsiders—agencies, government officials, insurers, and others—might con-
clude that they want to encourage organizations to pay closer attention to
lawsuit data.243  After closely examining practices in only two settings, it is
impossible to reach definitive conclusions about the types of interventions
that would increase attention to lawsuit data in all organizational settings.244
Nevertheless, this Section offers several possible interventions inspired by the
comparison of police departments and hospitals that might cause police to
increase the attention they pay to lawsuits and might be of use to those inter-
ested in encouraging introspection in other organizational settings.
First, law enforcement agencies need stronger incentives to engage in
introspection through litigation.  Researchers, policymakers, and advocates
should continue to call for law enforcement to engage in systemic reviews of
errors when they occur.  The Department of Justice should continue to
require the departments it investigates and prosecutes to gather and analyze
242 See Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics, supra note 10, at 1065–66 (observing that
“[s]ome city attorneys discretely ‘pocket[ ]’ information developed during the lawsuit that
might reflect poorly on their client” and other attorneys “more explicitly refuse to assist
internal investigations” for fear that transparency would harm their client’s case).
243 For some discussion of how outsiders might think about the relative value of lawsuit
data to an organization’s performance improvement efforts, see generally supra Section
I.D.  For discussion about how introspection through litigation might coexist with other
priorities, see infra notes 250–52 and accompanying text.
244 Despite the differences between police departments and hospitals, they share sev-
eral characteristics in common.  Both, for example, are engaged in public or quasi-public
services; both also rely heavily on their employees to make split-second, high-stakes deci-
sions that will invariably lead to error.  Indeed, hospitals and police departments may share
more in common with each other than they do with other types of organizations.  Accord-
ingly, the practices in police departments and hospitals, and the comparison of the two,
may offer limited guidance for other types of organizations.
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lawsuits for performance lessons.  Steps could also be taken to increase the
financial incentives for police departments to review lawsuit data.  Local,
state, or federal governments could require police departments to gather and
analyze lawsuit data as a condition of funding.245  Police departments could
be required to bear more financial responsibility for litigation costs.246
Police departments could also take a more active role in approving litigation
decisions: defense counsel might be more likely to share information about
pending suits with police officials if those officials had settlement authority.
Evidence of the value of lawsuit data could also be used to encourage
police officials and those overseeing police departments to gather and ana-
lyze information from lawsuits.  This is already happening to some extent; the
effective uses of lawsuit data in Seattle, Portland, and the Los Angeles Sher-
iff’s Department inspired New York City to adopt the ClaimStat program.247
If ClaimStat helps reduce litigation costs in New York City, this model may
well be adopted by other jurisdictions.  Malpractice insurers’ closed claims
studies have identified trends in errors across multiple hospitals; perhaps,
encouraged by the success of these studies, municipal insurers could begin
examining police litigation trends across jurisdictions for similar lessons.
Personnel could also be hired to gather and analyze lawsuit data and
other relevant information about organizational performance.  The Depart-
ment of Justice could recommend appointing these types of personnel to the
departments it investigates and advises.  Federal grants could be offered to
departments that make these hires.248  Or cities and counties could hire
more police auditors and risk managers on their own initiative, inspired by
the productive role these personnel have played in performance improve-
ment efforts in other jurisdictions.249
When considering the sensibility of various approaches to encourage
introspection through litigation, policymakers should recognize that some
approaches might have undesirable secondary effects.  For example, eviden-
tiary protections appear to reduce the fears associated with discussing pend-
ing lawsuits for quality improvement purposes in hospitals.250  Perhaps
245 See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 171, at 1132–44 (describing the federal government’s
authority to collect data, and reasons why that authority is not being used to collect data
about police behavior); Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics, supra note 10, at 1082 (suggesting
that municipalities require police departments to gather and analyze suits as a condition of
funding or indemnification).
246 See Schwartz, supra note 149, at 958 (suggesting that departments be required to
take more financial responsibility for litigation costs).
247 See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
248 See Harmon, supra note 153, at 54–55 (recommending that the Department of Jus-
tice offer grants to police departments to improve infrastructure and personnel in ways
that promote civil rights).
249 See Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics, supra note 10, at 1084 (describing the role of
outside monitors and auditors in efforts to increase police departments’ collection and
analysis of information).
250 See Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1264–66 (describing the effects of
evidentiary protections on hospitals’ internal discussions of error).
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similar evidentiary protections would encourage more discussion about law-
suits within police departments.  Yet orders protecting discovery of internal
information could limit the public disclosure of litigation information and
thereby inhibit lawsuits’ role as a source of information for the public.251
Such orders could also impair the ability of plaintiffs to gather the informa-
tion they need to prove their claims.252  Moreover, there is no guarantee that
giving police this type of evidentiary protection would actually lead to
increased introspection without other shifts in incentives, views of lawsuits’
informational value, and personnel.  More study would be necessary to assess
the costs and benefits of evidentiary protections for police before making a
recommendation in this regard.
Other strategies to encourage introspection through litigation will not
require such stark tradeoffs between different regulatory strategies.  For
example, hiring a risk manager will not compromise plaintiffs’ ability to pre-
vail on their claims or limit public access to lawsuit data.  Moreover, some
interventions would likely lead a police department to engage in multiple
efforts to improve performance beyond simply reviewing lawsuits for lessons.
A police risk manager might—in addition to reviewing lawsuit data—also
institute a mediation program, work to improve internal affairs investiga-
tions, and assist with training and supervision issues.
Any intervention will, however, require some type of tradeoff.  Hiring a
risk manager will cost money that could be used for other types of perform-
ance-improvement efforts, such as hiring more internal affairs investigators
or better training investigators already on the job, creating tip lines for peo-
ple to more easily report misconduct, establishing a civilian complaint review
board, or hiring a police auditor to oversee the department.  Alternatively,
the money spent to hire a risk manager could be used for other types of
police accountability efforts—dashboard cameras or body-mounted cameras,
for example.  A comparison of the relative costs and benefits of different
methods that could be used to increase constitutional policing and the
effects of those interventions on crime control efforts is far beyond the scope
of this Article.  I leave it to policymakers to make these judgments, but
encourage them to do so only after considering the particularities of the
organization, existing information systems, available resources, and the bene-
fits of introspection through litigation illustrated here.
CONCLUSION
Organizations can learn valuable information from lawsuits brought
against them.  Complaints describe claims of wrongdoing, discovery unearths
251 See generally Miller & Wright, supra note 150, at 780 (criticizing sealed settlement
agreements in police misconduct suits and advocating for more transparency); Rapoport &
Teich, supra note 54, at 233–34 (criticizing protective orders in aviation litigation because
litigation discovery generates useful, previously unknown information).
252 See Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 10, at 1298 (raising the same concern in
the medical malpractice context).
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details about those claims, and, throughout the litigation process, the parties
marshal available evidence in ways that can reveal previously unseen patterns
in the data and frame defendants’ behavior in relation to applicable legal
standards.  Despite the value of litigation information, some organizations do
not integrate the data into their performance improvement efforts.  I have
offered several tentative explanations for why that might be the case.  Organi-
zations need the incentives to improve behavior, an understanding of the
value of lawsuit data to their performance improvement efforts, and the per-
sonnel and infrastructure to collect and analyze the data.
Although this Article focuses primarily on the behavior of law enforce-
ment agencies and hospitals, introspection through litigation is relevant in
contexts far removed from policing and medical care.  Contemporary society
is populated by bureaucracies—schools, food producers, and retailers—that
function through the discretionary acts of their lowest-level employees.  The
larger and more complex the organization, the more levels of delegation and
discretion separate front-line employees from boardroom executives.  In
such settings, information about possible wrongdoing must reach higher-
level decisionmakers.  Even with robust internal information systems, impor-
tant information about errors may be overlooked, disregarded, or hidden.  In
these complex organizations, lawsuits are one means of bringing this diffuse
information to the surface.  Putting litigation information into the hands of
organizational leaders is one promising, but long overlooked, means of
improving organizational performance.
